Gobeil, Judge. In 2018, a Cobb County jury found Antonio Brooks guilty of two counts of rape, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of false imprisonment, and one count of burglary, based on incidents that occurred in 1986. He filed a motion for new trial, as amended. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Brooks’s motion. In his instant appeal,[1] Brooks argues that the trial court erred by: finding that Brooks knowingly and intelligently waived his right to post-conviction counsel; denying his request for a mandatory transfer hearing as the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the matter; denying Brooks’s motion for a plea in bar; admitting bad character evidence; and denying Brooks’s request for an in-camera review of prison records. Brooks further contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. On appeal from a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to support the jury’s verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, but determine only whether the evidence authorized the jury to find the defendant guilty of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt in accordance with the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Hall v. State, 335 Ga. App. 895, 895 (783 SE2d 400) (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). So viewed, the record shows that D. S. was visiting from out of state over labor day weekend in 1986 and stayed with her boyfriend at his apartment in Cobb County. On September 1, 1986, after her boyfriend left for work, D. S. took a shower. When she stepped out of the shower and was drying her hair, she was attacked by a man wielding a knife. The man threw D. S. back into the bathroom, threatened to kill her, held the knife to her throat, and raped her by inserting his penis into her vagina, forcibly and against her will. D. S. was unable to get a good look at her assailant because it was dark in the bathroom and he had a hood over his head. After raping her, the man threw D. S. into the bathtub, turned on the cold water, and threatened to kill D. S. and her boyfriend if she reported the incident. After the perpetrator left, D. S. went to a friend’s apartment and called the police. The police responded and D. S. was taken to the hospital where a rape kit was performed. Two days later, on September 3, 1986, M. H. was in her apartment in Cobb County when an unknown young man came to her door and asked her for help in finding someone in the apartment complex for a delivery. When M. H. opened the door, the man forced his way in, beat her, punched her in the face with his fist, and then raped her. The man then forced M. H. to take a shower to try and wash away any evidence, and threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the incident. After reporting the attack to the police, M. H. went to the hospital where a rape kit was performed. M. H. died in 2013. In May 2013, Detective Shannon Arrowood of the Marietta Police Department received a phone call from a concerned citizen about a potential rape that occurred back in 1986. The detective conducted an investigation, which uncovered old police reports about two unsolved rapes from September 1986 in which DNA evidence was collected from the victims, D. S. and M. H. The police requested that the DNA evidence be run through the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”) database.[2] The search yielded a hit to Brooks, who was serving a 30-year sentence for 1988 convictions for rape and aggravated sodomy. Law enforcement was notified about the match on September 12, 2013, upon completion of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) report. In January 2016, Brooks was indicted on two counts of rape (Counts 1 and 4), two counts of aggravated assault (Counts 2 and 5), two counts of false imprisonment (Counts 3 and 6), and two counts of burglary (Counts 7 and 8) for the incidents involving D. S. and M. H.[3] At trial, a GBI forensic biologist testified that the male DNA recovered from both victims’ rape kits was identical and matched to Brooks. The jury found Brooks guilty on Counts 1 to 7. The trial court sentenced him to a total term of two consecutive life sentences plus 20 years to be served in confinement with an additional 20 years on probation. Brooks, who had been represented by counsel at trial, filed a counseled motion for new trial, as amended. He also filed a pro se motion for new trial while still represented by counsel.[4] After Brooks executed a detailed waiver of his right to representation, the trial court held a Faretta[5] inquiry during the December 7, 2020 hearing on Brooks’s motion for new trial. The court subsequently granted Brooks’s request to proceed post trial without counsel.[6] He then filed additional amendments to his now pro se motion for new trial. The trial court denied Brooks’s motion, and this appeal followed. Before we reach the merits of the appeal, we note that Brooks’s initial pro se brief fails to comply with this Court’s rules because he includes several arguments within the body of his brief that are not listed as numbered and distinct enumerations of error. Court of Appeals Rule 25 (a) (4); Riggins v. State, 128 Ga. App. 478, 478 (2) (197 SE2d 154) (1973) (absent an enumeration of error relating to alleged error argued by defendant in his brief, this Court was without jurisdiction to consider alleged error). He also fails to support many of his arguments with citations to the record and legal authority.[7] See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1) (“Any enumeration of error that is not supported in the brief by citation of authority or argument may be deemed abandoned.”). Brooks’s pro se status at the time he filed his initial brief did not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the rules of this Court. See Wimbush v. State, 345 Ga. App. 54, 59 (812 SE2d 489) (2018) (“The rules of this [C]ourt are not intended to provide an obstacle for the unwary or the pro se appellant.”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Briefs that do not conform to our rules “hinder this [C]ourt in determining the substance and basis of an appellant’s contentions both in fact and in law and may well prejudice an appellant’s appeal regardless of the amount of leniency shown.” Id. at 59-60 (citation and punctuation omitted). Nevertheless, in our discretion, we will address his claims of error to the extent we are able to understand them in conjunction with his counseled reply brief. Bennett v. Moody, 225 Ga. App. 95, 96 (483 SE2d 350) (1997). 1. Although not listed in his enumeration of errors in his initial brief, Brooks alleges that he “was forced under duress to proceed pro se.” In his reply brief, Brooks expands on this argument, asserting: he was never specifically advised of the dangers of proceeding pro se during post-conviction proceedings; he had an interest in ensuring that all necessary steps were taken to prepare his defense case; his trial counsel should have been subpoenaed to appear at the motion for new trial hearing; and the trial court failed to take proper consideration of his statements — including wanting to talk to his post-conviction counsel and file a motion for appointment of new counsel — as proof of his desire to proceed with counsel rather than pro se. As an initial matter, Brooks was represented by four different attorneys before the trial court. John Hildebrand (“first trial counsel”) represented Brooks from May 3, 2016 until August 12, 2016. Kevin Rodgers (“trial counsel”) represented Brooks from August 12, 2016 through the conclusion of his trial in June 2018. Brian Hobbs was appointed to represent Brooks in post-conviction proceedings on July 17, 2018, and he served in that role until August 2019. Sylvia Goldman (“post-conviction counsel”) was then appointed on August 22, 2019, and represented Brooks until the trial court granted his request to proceed pro se on December 9, 2020. “A criminal defendant in Georgia is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel during his trial, motion for new trial proceeding, and direct appeal.” Allen v. Dakar, 311 Ga. 485, 497 (2) (858 SE2d 731) (2021) (citation and punctuation omitted). “In most cases, before a defendant may properly proceed pro se in initial postconviction proceedings and on direct appeal, he must be advised of the dangers of such selfrepresentation and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right to appellate counsel on the record.” Donovan v. State, 362 Ga. App. 408, 409 (2) (a) (868 SE2d 808) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). See generally Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806, 835 (V) (95 SCt 2525, 45 LE2d 562) (1975) (“[I]n order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo [the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel]. Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose selfrepresentation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). “A trial court’s ruling as to whether the defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was valid is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Britt v. State, 362 Ga. App. 456, 456 (868 SE2d 824) (2022) (citation and punctuation omitted). On July 22, 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court held a hearing via video conference on Brooks’s motion for new trial. Brooks claimed that he did not have the funds to afford “zealous” representation and objected to the virtual hearing because he had “a very tremendous amount of paperwork, a long paper trail,” that he wished to “submit on the record, in open court.” He also asked whether he would be permitted to talk or meet with his post-conviction counsel (who was also present at the hearing) as he had not had the opportunity to properly confer with her. According to Brooks, his attorneys had not met with him sufficiently to allow him to “present [his] side of the case or [his] story[, and] [t]hey have taken it on themselves to do what they wanted to do.” Brooks then stated: “So, at this time, I will ask could I proceed pro se, as I have been trying to proceed pro se?” Brooks indicated that he wished to proceed pro se in order to pursue all of his desired claims in his motion for new trial, as well as file additional motions. In response, postconviction counsel explained that she had been in “constant communication” with Brooks, but he did not feel that she was “delving deep enough” into the history of his charges. The State then suggested that the trial court hold a Faretta hearing. After the State moved for a continuance on Brooks’s behalf, the trial court adjourned the hearing. The court directed post-conviction counsel to confer with Brooks to “find out whether or not he wants to go forward with you or without you.” At the next hearing, on December 7, 2020, the trial court accommodated Brooks’s request that he be permitted to be physically present in the courtroom; postconviction counsel and the State appeared via video conference. The trial judge asked Brooks: “Do you still want to represent yourself or do you want [post-conviction counsel] to act as your attorney?” Brooks replied that he had been unable to hear post-conviction counsel during a video call the day before, and asked the court for additional time to speak to her before his motion for new trial hearing, as he had not spoken to counsel for months. But he acknowledged that he and postconviction counsel had spoken, as per the court’s instruction, at the conclusion of the July 2020 hearing. Brooks continued [post-conviction counsel] did send me a Faretta [w]aiver,[[8]] as [the trial court] had suggested. She did send me that as well. But, basically, what I was wanting to know is that there were some things that I was asking to be done, your Honor, and if those things are able to be done, then I would much rather have a 20-year seasoned attorney as [post-conviction counsel] is. But if those things [have] not been done, then yes, I would have to proceed [pro se]. Brooks also expressed a desire for first trial counsel and trial counsel to be present at his motion for new trial hearing to present evidence in support of his ineffective-assistance claims. In response, post-conviction counsel explained that she was not prepared to breach her duty as an officer of the court and put forth meritless claims. Counsel described that Brooks wanted her to “adopt his pleadings, put [her] bar number on it and argue what he’s done. And I’ve already told him I would not do that.” The trial court asked postconviction counsel if she had informed Brooks of the potential “dangers and pitfalls” of pursuing his own litigation strategy in connection with the motion for new trial, which included subpoenaing first trial counsel and trial counsel. Postconviction counsel confirmed that she and Brooks had had those conversations on “multiple occasions.” In response, the trial court explained to Brooks that: If you want to put forth these arguments that this seasoned lawyer believes will not help you and if you want to put these lawyers on the witness stand, where — by the way, the State would be able to ask them questions, not just you, but the State can ask them questions. That’s a very, very dangerous thing to do. It doesn’t bother me one way or the other if you do it, but it’s a very dangerous thing to do.” After being placed under oath, the trial court asked Brooks if he wanted to represent himself. In response, Brooks described the legal arguments he wanted to raise in his motion for new trial. This exchange followed: COURT: Let me interrupt you. I have one question for you, and we either do this or I’m sending you right back. BROOKS: Yes, sir. Let’s move forward. COURT: If you want to represent yourself, then I have some stuff I need to do. BROOKS: Yes, sir. COURT: If you want to use this lawyer, then that’s a different matter. I need to know. BROOKS: Well, no, sir, it doesn’t sound like you’re scratching the surface of the issues, your Honor. Let’s please move forward with the Faretta hearing, sir. COURT: I need to know in your own words, “Judge, I want to represent myself” or “Judge, I want [post-conviction counsel] to represent me.” Just give me one of those two. BROOKS: No, sir, I cannot say that I want [post-conviction counsel] to represent me. The issues that you said that you would allow, that I have submitted in my — COURT: Do you want to represent yourself or not? BROOKS: Yes, sir, I want to represent myself. COURT: All right. We’ll go ahead with the Faretta hearing. In a lengthy colloquy, the trial court went through the advantages of retaining counsel and the risks of self-representation with Brooks. In the middle of the court’s questions, Brooks asserted that he wanted to file a motion seeking the appointment of new counsel “if [post-conviction counsel] was not wanting to argue my issues,” to which the court replied that Brooks would either have to continue with his current counsel or proceed pro se. Brooks confirmed that he had not been threatened in any way, no one had promised him anything, and that he knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel after talking to both the trial judge and post-conviction counsel. The court ultimately concluded that Brooks knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Brooks then produced his previously-addressed motion for appointment of new post-conviction counsel, which the trial court determined was moot, given the court’s determination that Brooks knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to post-conviction counsel and elected to proceed pro se. Contrary to Brooks’s assertion, the trial court tailored its questioning during the Faretta inquiry to ensure that Brooks was aware of the dangers of proceeding pro se during his post-conviction proceedings. An examination of the record reveals that the court specifically advised Brooks that if he represented himself during his motion for new trial and on appeal, he would not be able to raise ineffective-assistance claims against himself, and he retained the right to appointed counsel at all stages of the case. Notably, our Supreme Court has clarified that it “has not endorsed a specific colloquy that trial courts should use when advising defendants of the dangers of selfrepresentation in postconviction proceedings[.]” Allen, 311 Ga. at 498 (2) (a) n. 11. See Stinson v. State, 352 Ga. App. 528, 531-532 (1) (a) (835 SE2d 342) (2019) (defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel in trial proceedings; defendant informed court that he needed to “go pro se,” after which court conducted Faretta hearing, during which trial court advised defendant of potential consequences of proceeding pro se, including constitutional rights he would be giving up and that he would be responsible for preparing and making strategic decisions for trial and preserving trial record). Importantly, the trial court’s colloquy included information regarding the dangers of self-representation in post-conviction proceedings. Compare Allen, 311 Ga. at 498499 (2) (a) (holding that “the record demonstrate[d] that [defendant] did not receive warnings regarding the dangers of selfrepresentation on appeal and [so] did not expressly waive his right to appellate counsel” even though the trial court had “explained to [defendant] in detail the consequences of his selfrepresentation at trial and found that he was aware of his rights and the consequences of proceeding without an attorney [at that stage]“); Britt, 362 Ga. App. at 458-459 (trial court abused its discretion in finding a waiver of defendant’s right to counsel in postconviction proceeding on defendant’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea of guilty; while the record showed that defendant was warned of the dangers of selfrepresentation at trial, there were no discussions at any of the hearings about the dangers of selfrepresentation in the postconviction phase). Brooks also argues that his first trial counsel and trial counsel should have been subpoenaed, either by post-conviction counsel or the State, to appear at the motion for new trial hearing. At the July 22, 2020 hearing, the State simply indicated that it “may, at some other juncture, ask for [a] continuance in order to bring [first trial counsel] or [trial counsel] to court to testify.” However, the State was under no obligation to present evidence on the issue of trial counsel’s performance at trial at the motion for new trial hearing. See McClarity v. State, 234 Ga. App. 348, 351 (3) (506 SE2d 392) (1998) (“The burden is on the party alleging error to show it affirmatively by the record[.]“) (citation and punctuation omitted). Brooks’s post-conviction counsel explained at the December 7, 2020 hearing that she did not subpoena Brooks’s first trial counsel and trial counsel to appear at the motion for new trial hearing because she did not believe that there was any merit to Brooks’s ineffective-assistance claims. Following the Faretta inquiry at the same hearing, Brooks indicated to the trial court that he was ready to proceed pro se on his motion for new trial and did not need additional time to procure witnesses despite being given an opportunity to do so. Brooks contends that the trial court failed to acknowledge that his statements at the motion for new trial hearing demonstrated a desire to continue with counsel rather than pro se. First, he highlights that the trial court refused his requests for additional time with counsel to ensure that all necessary steps were taken to prepare his case. However, at the December 7, 2020 hearing, post-conviction counsel stated that she “had multiple conversations with [Brooks] through his mom calling and doing third-parties. [Counsel] also arranged through the prison to have a conversation with him that went more than 45 minutes.” The record shows that additional time would not have changed Brooks’s situation because post-conviction counsel explained that she could not put forth all the claims that Brooks wanted her to file while also fulfilling her duty as an officer of the court. Brooks also notes that he asked the court to appoint him new post-conviction counsel, but the court ignored his requests. However, this assertion mischaracterizes what transpired at the hearing. The court advised Brooks that he could either be represented by current post-conviction counsel or proceed pro se. Even though Brooks disagreed with post-conviction counsel’s proposed strategy, it was squarely within the trial court’s discretion to conclude that Brooks knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel in order to pursue his desired claims in his motion for new trial. See Holsey v. State, 291 Ga. App. 216, 218-219 (2) (661 SE2d 621) (2008) (“An indigent defendant is not entitled to have his appointed counsel discharged unless he can demonstrate justifiable dissatisfaction with counsel, such as conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict, or a complete breakdown in communication between counsel and client. Where a defendant does not have a good reason for discharging his courtappointed attorney, the trial court does not err in requiring him to choose between representation by that attorney and proceeding pro se.”) (citations and punctuation omitted). Given these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Brooks knowingly and intelligently waived his right to post-conviction counsel and he was not entitled to the appointment of new counsel. Donovan, 362 Ga. App. at 409 (2) (a); see State v. Evans, 285 Ga. 67, 69 (673 SE2d 243) (2009) (explaining that record of Faretta hearing showed defendant’s waiver of his right to trial counsel was made intelligently and knowingly, where “trial court repeatedly cautioned [the defendant] about the dangers of selfrepresentation, and discussed the benefits of having qualified counsel representing him, and [the defendant] clearly understood what he was undertaking” by representing himself). 2. Brooks argues that the superior court erred by failing to hold a transfer hearing.[9] Because Brooks was sixteen at the time of the offenses in September 1986, he maintains that the juvenile court had original jurisdiction over the case. Brooks filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment based on this same argument, which the trial court denied. However, Brooks fails to acknowledge that under OCGA § 15-11-560 (b) (4), “[t]he superior court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the trial of any child 13 to 17 years of age who is alleged to have committed . . . rape[.]” (The superior court does have discretion to transfer some types of cases over which it has exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court, but not rape. OCGA § 1511560 (e) (1)). Additionally, only the district attorney, upon specific findings, retains the ability to transfer the case to the juvenile court. See OCGA § 15-11-560 (d). Brooks has failed to show that he was entitled to a transfer hearing and this claim is without merit. 3. Brooks contends that the trial court erred in failing to give “the contested jury charge.” However, Brooks does not specify the exact jury charge the trial court should have delivered to the jury, and thus, we deem this claim abandoned. See Court of Appeals Rule 25 (d) (1). 4. Brooks argues that the trial court erred in denying his plea in bar based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitation and that his indictment was based on “stale facts.”[10] Specifically, he asserts that he was not “unknown” as the perpetrator of the crimes because his DNA was entered into the CODIS database in 2008, and thus, the statute of limitation on all his charges had expired by the time he was indicted in 2016. “In criminal cases, the period of limitation runs from the commission of the offense to the date of the indictment. The burden is on the State to prove that a crime occurred within the applicable statute of limitation.” Beavers v. State, 345 Ga. App. 870, 871 (815 SE2d 223) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). “The appellate standard of review for a plea in bar asserting a statute of limitations defense is a de novo review of the issue of laws.” Duke v. State, 298 Ga. App. 719, 720 (1) (681 SE2d 174) (2009) (citation and punctuation omitted). Where a trial court’s ruling “involves a mixed question of fact and law, we accept the trial court’s findings on disputed facts and witness credibility unless they are clearly erroneous, but independently apply the law to the facts.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). When the offenses occurred in September 1986, the offense of rape was punishable by death or by imprisonment for life, or by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.[11] As a result, the statutory period of limitation for rape was seven years.[12] Absent any tolling of the limitation period, no indictment could be brought on the rape charges after September 1993. As for the charges of aggravated assault, false imprisonment, and burglary, the statutory period of limitation for these offenses was four years.[13] Absent any tolling of the limitation period, no indictment on these offenses could be brought after September 1990. Here, the subject indictment was returned on January 7, 2016. The indictment included the following tolling provisions: For each of the aforementioned counts of this Indictment to which the statute of limitations applies, Counts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, pursuant to OCGA § 1732, the Grand Jurors aforesaid also find that the accused person committing the aforementioned crimes was unknown until February 17, 2014, to wit: said accused was not positively identified as having committed the aforementioned crimes until DNA results were obtained in February of 2014.[[14]] The “person unknown” exception applies when the identity of the person who committed the crime is unknown, and it tolls the limitation period from the time the crime was committed until that person’s identity becomes known to the State. See OCGA § 1732 (2) (“[t]he period within which a prosecution must be commenced . . . does not include any period in which [t]he person committing the crime is unknown”). Our Supreme Court has clarified that the identity of the perpetrator becomes “known” to the State when the State becomes aware of facts that give rise to probable cause to arrest that person for the crime. Riley v. State, 305 Ga. 163, 169 (3) (824 SE2d 249) (2019) (statute of limitation is tolled “until the State possesses sufficient evidence to authorize the lawful arrest of that person for the crime charged”). Probable cause exists when the facts known to the State could lead a reasonably prudent person to conclude that there is a probability — more than mere suspicion, but less than absolute certainty — that the defendant committed the offense. Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 748-749 (2) (770 SE2d 636) (2015); see Riley, 305 Ga. at 169 (3) (“[t]he test of probable cause requires merely a probability”) (citation and punctuation omitted). Thus, to establish that the person unknown exception applies, the State must show that the facts within its knowledge — including knowledge imputed from the victim — were not enough to lead a reasonably prudent person to identify the defendant as the perpetrator until a time that, relative to the indictment, was within the limitation period. See Riley, 305 Ga. at 169 (3) (“[T]he State has the burden of proving that it lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for a time sufficient to deem the indictment or other charging document timely.”); accord Lewis v. State, 306 Ga. 455, 463 (4) (831 SE2d 771) (2019) (tolling applies where “the State has not obtained sufficient information to establish probable cause to arrest a particular suspect”). If the known facts would allow prudent persons to draw differing conclusions on this point, probable cause exists. See Hughes, 296 Ga. at 749 (2); State v. Culler, 351 Ga. App. 19, 23 (830 SE2d 434) (2019). On appeal, Brooks argues that the State should have discovered his identity earlier because his DNA was first entered into CODIS on January 22, 2008 after the Department of Corrections took a sample from him while he was incarcerated on his 1988 convictions. However, Brooks fails to point to any evidence that the State had actual knowledge that Brooks committed the instant crimes until the GBI report showing a DNA match to Brooks came back in September 2013. Importantly, we have refused to interpret the person unknown tolling provision contained in OCGA § 17-3-2 (2) as applying a constructive knowledge or “should have known” standard. See Beasley v. State, 244 Ga. App. 836, 837-838 (536 SE2d 825) (2000) (rejecting defendant’s assertion that the State should have been charged with knowledge of his identity because it did not exercise reasonable diligence in matching his fingerprint until more than four years after the burglary); Countryman v. State, 355 Ga. App. 573, 580 (1) (845 SE2d 312) (2020) (“the tolling period ends when the State has actual, as opposed to constructive, knowledge of both the defendant’s identity and the crime”) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). In sum, we conclude that the State was not chargeable with knowledge that gave rise to probable cause to arrest Brooks for the instant crimes until September 2013, when it received a positive CODIS hit on Brooks from DNA recovered from the victims’ rape kits. The seven-year statute of limitation for rape and four-year statute of limitation for the other crimes began to run as of September 2013, and the operative January 2016 indictment issued within the limitation period. As a result, the trial court properly denied Brooks’s plea in bar based on the statute of limitation. 5. Brooks asserts that the trial court erred in admitting “bad character evidence” pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404.[15] We find no reversible error. In the first instance, the State filed a pretrial motion indicating that it intended to “introduce evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts” at trial under OCGA § 24-4-413, and not Rule 404 as alleged by Brooks. Specifically, the State sought to introduce evidence of Brooks’s 1988 convictions for rape and aggravated sodomy, to which Brook’s trial counsel objected. Following a hearing, the trial court granted the State’s motion, concluding in relevant part “that the probative value of the extrinsic act of sexual assault is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice,” and “there is [a] prosecutorial need for said evidence and the extrinsic act of sexual assault is similar in nature to the sexual assaults that [Brooks] is charged with in the current case.” Brooks’s 1988 convictions were subsequently admitted at trial subject to trial counsel’s prior objection.[16] OCGA § 244413 (a) provides: “In a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the accused’s commission of another offense of sexual assault shall be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” This provision “supersede[s] the provisions of OCGA § 244404 (b) [[17]] in sexual assault and child molestation cases . . . and create[s] a rule of inclusion. . . .” Dixon v. State, 341 Ga. App. 255, 258 (1) (800 SE2d 11) (2017) (citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted). Moreover, “the State can seek to admit evidence unde
