Dillard, Presiding Judge. David Carr appeals his convictions for numerous child-sex offenses, contending the evidence was insufficient to support them and the trial court erred in failing to merge some of his convictions for sentencing purposes. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict,[1] the record shows that during the relevant time period, Ta. C. lived with Carr, her mother, her sister (Ti. C.), and her brother. When Ta. C. was in sixth grade, Carr began inserting his finger into her vagina on numerous occasions. Then, when Ta. C. was in eighth grade, Carr would sometimes get into Ta. C.’s bed with her, lay behind her, and touch her vagina. Carr also touched Ta. C.’s chest area, both under and over her clothes. In early January 2016, Carr came into Ta. C.’s room and touched her under her clothes on her “breasts and on [her] vagina area[,]” which made her cry. Shortly after that incident, when Ta. C. was upset about not being allowed to go out with friends, Carr told her that it did not matter to him if she was angry, the sexual abuse was going to end, and he did not care if she told her mom about the abuse or “if [he] went to jail tomorrow.” After this conversation, Ta. C. called her boyfriend and told him about the abuse she suffered in detail, and he advised her to tell her mother about it. Ta. C.’s boyfriend also suggested that she tell her younger sister, Ti. C., but instead, she let him do it. And when Ti. C. learned Carr was sexually abusing her sister, she “broke down and told [Ta. C.] that it was happening to her too.” Ti. C. estimated that Carr began sexually abusing her in fourth grade, but she was not entirely sure. Carr touched Ti. C. on her “lower private area” over the clothes “more times than [she] could really count.” He also touched Ti. C.’s “lower private area” under the clothes approximately five times. When he did so, he would place pressure inside of that area with his hands. Carr would occasionally stop the abuse for a month or two, and Ti. C. described the frequency of the abuse as “kind of like a cycle.” On the same day in early January 2016, when Ti. C. learned that Carr was also sexually abusing Ta. C., the girls’ mother came into the room and asked Ta. C.—who was crying—why she was upset. The girls did not want to tell their mother about the abuse verbally, so they both wrote notes describing what happened to them. Ta. C. wrote that she was in middle school when the abuse first occurred, and the most recent time Carr abused her was earlier that week. Indeed, according to Ta. C., Carr’s sexual abuse continued periodically until she was a sophomore in high school. Ti. C. wrote a similar note describing the abuse detailed above. The girls’ mother reacted calmly, telling them they would act like everything was normal and go to the police after Carr fell asleep. And that night, after Carr fell asleep, Ta. C., Ti. C., and their mother went to the police station to report Carr’s abusive conduct. Thereafter, Carr was charged, via indictment, with aggravated battery, four counts of child molestation, four counts of sexual battery, and two counts of first-degree cruelty to children. And following trial, he was convicted of all charged offenses. Carr then filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied after a hearing. This appeal follows. 1. In describing his second claim of error (which we address first), Carr summarily states the evidence was insufficient to support all eleven of his convictions. But because he does not make any cognizable arguments to support this contention, he has abandoned it. Despite arguing the evidence was insufficient to support all of his convictions, he does not discuss any particular conviction, their respective elements, or the evidence supposedly lacking at trial. Instead, he merely provides a laundry list of mostly irrelevant legal citations and statutes with no corresponding claim, discussion, or argument of any kind. Specifically, Carr recites the law regarding (1) the standard of review for sufficiency claims; (2) his right to an appeal; (3) his right to effective appellate counsel; (4) Georgia’s ban on appellate attorneys in criminal cases filing Anders[2] briefs; and (5) the requirement that defendants must comply with trial and appellate procedures to be entitled to habeas corpus relief. Finally, he states that he is entitled to review of “any claim which affords him relief,” and thus, the jury verdict should be reversed. Under these circumstances, Carr has provided us with no argument related to any of the legal authorities he lists, much less any argument regarding the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions.[3] In reaching the foregoing conclusion, we acknowledge the significant liberty interests at stake when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Georgia recently discontinued its practice of examining such claims when the issue is neither briefed nor meaningfully argued on appeal.[4] In doing so, our Supreme Court advised that “it is almost always a better course to decide the appeal the parties bring us, rather than the appeal we might have brought were we in counsel’s shoes.”[5] Lastly, and particularly relevant here, failing to acknowledge that an appellate attorney filed an insufficient brief in a criminal case “may . . . frustrate future habeas corpus review.”[6] Thus, we decline to evaluate this abandoned claim of error on the merits. 2. Carr next argues the trial court erred in failing to merge several of his child-molestation and sexual-battery convictions for sentencing purposes. We agree the trial court erred in failing to merge some of the counts at issue. Recently, in Scott v. State[7] (Scott I), the Supreme Court of Georgia explained the law as to merger analysis. Merger usually occurs when “a defendant is prosecuted for and determined by trial or plea to be guilty of multiple criminal charges but then, as a matter of substantive double jeopardy law, can be punished—convicted and sentenced—for only one of those crimes.”[8] The Scott I Court explained that “[m]erger analysis often involves counts charging two different crimes,”[9] and made clear “that is the context in which Drinkard’s [[10]] ‘required evidence’ test is applied.”[11] But merger questions may also arise when “a defendant is charged with multiple counts of the same crime”[12]—which is the situation here because Carr was charged with and found guilty of four counts of child molestation and four counts of sexual battery. And this type of merger analysis “requires careful interpretation of the criminal statute at issue to identify the ‘unit of prosecution’—’the precise act or conduct’ that the legislature criminalized.”[13] Indeed, whether a particular course of conduct “involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute depends on this legislative choice.”[14] In some child-molestation cases, “where the acts . . . appear to have occurred in discrete incidents,” the Scott I Court explained that “precisely identifying the applicable unit of prosecution may not affect the merger decision.”[15] On the one hand, when a rational trier of fact could conclude the criminal acts “occurred in discrete incidents over a relatively long period, . . . the State [is] authorized to charge the two crimes in two separate units of prosecution.”[16] On the other hand, when the criminal acts alleged in different counts of the indictment “were part of a single course of conduct occurring in a relatively short time frame, the unit of prosecution could determine if the defendant faces multiple, consecutive . . . sentences or only one sentence.”[17] As a result, the courseofconduct evaluation “may involve examining whether the defendant acted with the same or differing intents, whether the crimes occurred at the same place, and whether the crimes occurred at the same time or were separated by some meaningful interval of time.”[18] Finally, whether offenses merge is “a legal question, which an appellate court reviews de novo.”[19] With this analytical framework in mind, we will address each of Carr’s merger arguments in turn. (a) Child Molestation. As to Carr’s child-molestation charges, this Court’s recent holding in Scott v. State (Scott II)[20] determined the unit of prosection provided for in OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1)— “a single unit of prosecution for which [a defendant] is subject to only one conviction and sentence.”[21] In doing so, we explained that—despite the statute’s failure to set forth a unit of prosecution—the General Assembly had not, “by clear and unambiguous language, provided that multiple touches to a victim, during a single uninterrupted course of conduct, authorize multiple prosecutions and convictions for separate acts of child molestation.”[22] And given the foregoing, we must now consider whether the criminal acts alleged in the relevant child-molestation counts “[w]ere part of a single course of conduct occurring in a relatively short time frame . . .[,]“[23] or whether those acts appear “to have occurred in discrete incidents over a relatively long period, [such that] . . . the State [is] authorized to charge the two crimes in two different units of prosecution.”[24] (i) Counts Two and Three. Carr first argues counts two and three of the indictment should have merged for sentencing purposes because they both alleged that he committed the offense of child molestation by touching Ti. C.’s vaginal area and her breasts, respectively, during the same two-month period. But as explained by our Supreme Court, “it is an old and sound rule that error to be reversible must be harmful.”[25] And here, although the trial court did not merge count two with count three for sentencing purposes, it did merge count two with count one,[26] such that Carr’s conviction for count two was expunged and he was not sentenced for that child-molestation offense. Under these circumstances, Carr cannot show the trial court committed a reversible error in merging count two with count one, rather than merging count two with count three.[27] (ii) Counts Five and Six. Carr also argues the trial court erred by failing to merge counts five and six of his indictment for sentencing purposes because they both alleged that he committed the offense of child molestation against Ta. C. by touching her vaginal area and breasts, respectively, during the same time frame.[28] Count five of the indictment charged Carr with committing child molestation by touching Ta. C.’s vaginal area between January 1, 2013, and September 1, 2015. And count six of the indictment charged him with committing child molestation during the same period by touching her breasts. And as detailed above, the evidence shows that Carr committed these discrete acts over a relatively long period of time. Specifically, Ta. C. testified that Carr would get into her bed and touch her “vagina area” during the day while she was in sixth grade (before left on the bus to go to school), but did so in the early mornings—while it was still dark outside—after she graduated sixth grade. And Ta. C. also testified that he touched her “chest area” mostly on top of her clothes, but sometimes under her clothes. Significantly, Ta. C. testified that the sexual abuse lasted from when she was in sixth grade until she was a sophomore in high school. As a result, a reasonable jury could have concluded that the sexual abuse alleged in counts five and six of the indictment were discrete, separate offenses occurring over a period of years, rather than during a single course of conduct taking place over a relatively short period of time. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to merge counts five and six for sentencing purposes.[29] (b) Sexual Battery: Counts Seven through Ten. Carr further contends that his four sexual-battery convictions should have merged for sentencing purposes because the offenses occurred close in time and constituted an “uninterrupted course of conduct.” As an initial matter, unlike the statute criminalizing child molestation, it does not appear that either the Supreme Court of Georgia or this Court has yet determined the unit of prosecution provided for in OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b)—the statute criminalizing sexual battery.[30] As a result, to resolve this claim of error, we must make that determination now. To that end, in interpreting any statute, we necessarily begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”[31] And in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge is to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”[32] Thus, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,[33] consider the text contextually,[34] read the text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would,”[35] and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.”[36] And when the language of a statute is plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, “courts must construe the statute accordingly.”[37] Finally, as our Supreme Court has emphasized “numerous times, the text of the statute itself best reflects the legislative choice of whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct ‘offenses’ under the statute.”[38] Turning to the statute at issue, OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) provides that “[a] person commits the offense of sexual battery when he or she intentionally makes physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the consent of that person.”[39] And much like OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1), the child-molestation statute (which criminalizes “any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years . . . .”),[40] OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) also generally criminalizes any “physical contact with the intimate parts of someone else without his or her consent[,]“[41] without specifying the circumstances under which a defendant is subject to a single conviction for multiple illegal acts. In determining the child-molestation statute provides for a single unit of prosecution, this Court reasoned that the word “any” in OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1) could be construed to provide that “each act of sexual contact to a part of the victim’s body could demonstrate an intent to commit an independent and distinct abuse of the child victim that warrants a separate conviction and sentence, and signifies precisely the type of harm [the statute] seeks to prevent.”[42] But we also explained that “an uninterrupted course of conduct involving multiple unauthorized acts of molestation could constitute a single offense [under the statute].”[43] Ultimately, we concluded that—in evaluating the language of OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1)—the General Assembly “has not, by clear and unambiguous language, provided that multiple touches to a victim, during a single uninterrupted course of conduct, authorize multiple prosecutions and convictions for separate acts of child molestation.”[44] Thus, we construed the statute in favor of the defendant, finding that it did not authorize multiple child-molestation offenses under the circumstances.[45] Although OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b)—unlike OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1)—does not include the word “any,” it likewise fails to indicate whether it authorizes multiple convictions for separate prohibited “physical touches” occurring during a single uninterrupted course of conduct. Significantly, unlike the child-molestation and sexual-battery statutes, the General Assembly has elsewhere “employed clear, unambiguous language with respect to the applicable unit of prosecution in numerous other contexts throughout the Georgia Code.”[46] We must presume, then, that the General Assembly’s failure to do so in OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) was “a matter of considered choice.”[47] As we explained in Scott II, if the General Assembly “fails to denote the unit of prosecution in the statute, as is the case here, [then] courts must resolve the ambiguity and are constrained to do so in favor of the defendant charged with having violated the statute.”[48] Indeed, our Supreme Court has made clear that “a criminal statute must be construed strictly against the State, and if reasonable minds disagreed as to whether the statute is, in fact, ambiguous, the rule of lenity . . . require[s] us to interpret it in favor of the defendant.”[49] And while the State concedes OCGA § 16-6-22.1 does not explicitly identify the unit of prosecution applicable to sexual battery, it nevertheless contends the statute unambiguously provides that “each individual touch to each discrete body part [constitute separate criminal offenses], even if the touches are close together in time.” The State contends this is so because—unlike the child-molestation statute—OCGA § 16-6-22.1 specifically defines the body parts a defendant is prohibited from touching.[50] But regardless of the different body parts at issue, just like OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1), OCGA § 16-6-22.1 criminalizes certain types of conduct without indicating whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple offenses for each touch of the victim when they occur during a continuous course of contact.[51] And importantly, Scott II expressly held that when the General Assembly fails to denote the unit of prosecution in this type of statute, there is an ambiguity in the statute as to the unit of prosecution, which must be resolved in favor of the defendant.[52] In sum, interpreting OCGA § 16-6-22.1 (b) in favor of Carr, as we must, we hold the statute provides for a single unit of prosecution, such that he may not be convicted or sentenced for multiple sexual-battery offenses committed during an uninterrupted course of conduct. With this in mind, we turn now to Carr’s specific sexual-battery convictions. (i) Counts Seven and Eight. Counts seven and eight charged Carr with committing sexual battery against Ta. C. by making physical contact with her breasts and vagina, respectively, without her consent. Both counts alleged the sexual abuse occurred on or about December 31, 2015. Although Ta. C. testified that Carr sexually abused her over a period of years, she did not provide any specifics regarding the abuse that occurred on that particular day. Indeed, the State failed to present any evidence as to how much time elapsed between the criminal acts, and it is unclear whether they occurred during the same interaction with Ta. C. As a result, the trial court erred in failing to merge counts seven and eight for sentencing purposes,[53] and we vacate Carr’s convictions and sentences for counts seven and eight and remand the case for the trial court to convict and resentence him on only one of those counts.[54] (ii) Counts Nine and Ten. Finally, counts nine and ten of the indictment charged Carr with committing sexual battery on Ta. C. in the same manner alleged in counts seven and eight, respectively, except they alleged the sexual abuse occurred the next day, on January 1, 2016. Similarly to counts seven and eight, these separate allegations of sexual battery allegedly occurred on the same day, Ta. C. did not testify regarding the length of time that elapsed between Carr touching her breasts and him touching her vagina, and it is unclear whether those criminal acts occurred during a single interaction.[55] Thus, we must also remand this case for the trial court to vacate one of these convictions and merge them for sentencing purposes.[56] For all these reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand this case further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part, and case remanded with direction. Mercier and Pinson, JJ., concur.
