Hodges, Judge. Following a trial, the Juvenile Court of Glynn County adjudicated A. G. delinquent for acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted financial transaction card theft (OCGA § 16-9-31 (a)) and theft by taking (OCGA § 16-8-2). The juvenile court denied A. G.’s motion for new trial and A. G. appeals, arguing that the juvenile court applied an erroneous standard of proof and that the evidence was insufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency for financial card theft and theft by taking. Because the juvenile court did not apply the correct standard of proof, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Under our Juvenile Code, it is well settled that “the standard of proof on charges of a criminal nature is the same as that used in criminal proceedings against adults — proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt.” In the Interest of A. S., 293 Ga. App. 710, 712 (2) (667 SE2d 701) (2008); see also OCGA § 15-11-581; In the Interest of R. S., 317 Ga. App. 412 (731 SE2d 97) (2012). Here, A. G. was charged with financial transaction card theft and theft by taking based upon allegations that she removed a teacher’s wallet from his desk; the wallet contained a debit card, a credit card, and $1,000 in cash. The teacher’s wallet was found in A. G.’s book-bag, but the cards and cash were missing and were never returned to the teacher. However, evidence adduced at trial revealed that an internal school tribunal determined that A. G. did not violate any school rules as a result of the allegations and “found her not guilty.” Following the parties’ closing arguments at trial, the trial court remarked that [w]ell, I — you know, I — I’m following the argument and — and I’m right there with the tribunal until the wallet’s found in her book-bag. I — I’m not convinced. I think there’s still some evidence that she committed the acts, Theft by Taking and Financial Transaction Card Theft. I’m going to adjudicate her of both. (Emphasis supplied.) In its written order, the juvenile court stated that it is hereby found that the allegations of the petition are true . . ., that the acts attributed to or admitted by the child were, in fact, committed by said child, and that such acts constitute acts of delinquency . . . within the meaning of the law. . . . The child has been adjudicated on the following: Theft by Taking [and] Financial Transaction Card Theft.[[1]] “Where, as here, the trial judge acts as finder of fact, our duty is to make certain the proper standard was utilized by the court.” In the Interest of A. S., 293 Ga. App. at 713714 (2); see also Ward v. State, 353 Ga. App. 1, 14 (3) (836 SE2d 148) (2019). “Since [some evidence] is a different and lesser standard of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court did not apply the correct standard of proof in evaluating the evidence [in this case].” In the Interest of A. S., 293 Ga. App. at 712 (2). In cases where “a trial court considers a claim under an improper legal standard, we must vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand [the] case for the court to consider the claim under the proper standard.”[2] Ward, 353 Ga. App. at 13 (3). Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.[3] Judgment reversed and case remanded. Doyle, P. J., concurs. McFadden, C. J., dissents. * THIS OPINION IS PHYSICAL PRECEDENT ONLY. SEE COURT OF APPEALS RULE 33.2*
