The appellant, Juana Scott-Lasley, appeals from the final judgment entered by the trial court in her divorce action with the appellee, Mr. Lasley.1 On appeal, Ms. Scott-Lasley contends that the trial court erred in incorporating the portion of the parties’ agreement that provides for an automatic change of child custody; that the trial court erred in varying the appellee’s child support obligation outside the child support guidelines; and that the trial court erred by declining to include a provision requiring Mr. Lasley’s child support obligation to continue beyond the age of eighteen if any of the parties’ children were still enrolled in high school. We find merit to the first two contentions, but not to the latter contention. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse it in part. In the final decree that it entered in the parties’ divorce action, the trial court incorporated an agreement that the parties had reached regarding the custody of their three children. The agreement provided, in relevant part, that Ms. Scott-Lasley would have primary custody of the children, and that “in the event that one of the parents move outside the Atlanta metropolitan area 7 counties, he or she shall forfeit the right to physical custody of the children to the parent who remains in the 7 counties area.” As for child support, the trial court found that the gross income of the appellee, Charles Lasley, was $9,716.66 per month, and that the applicable percentage of gross income to be considered for child support for the three children was 25 to 32. The trial court awarded 25 of Mr. Lasley’s gross income, or $2,430 per month, as child support. The court also stated that it found the existence of a special circumstance, and it listed that circumstance as the report of the guardian ad litem. Finally, the decree provided that Mr. Lasley’s child support payments would be reduced by one-third as each minor child reached the age of eighteen, married, died, became self-supporting, or otherwise became emancipated.2
1. Ms. Scott-Lasley contends that the provision for an automatic change of custody in the event that one of the parties moved outside of the seven-county metropolitan Atlanta area violates this Court’s decision in Scott v. Scott .3 We agree. In Scott , this Court disapproved of self-executing change of custody provisions on the ground that judicial scrutiny was necessary at the time of the change to determine whether the change was in the child’s best interests.4 Moreover, we stated that our disapproval applied whether the self-executing provision originated with an agreement of the parties or with the trial court.5 Thus, in the present case, the self-executing change of custody provision violates this Court’s decision in Scott . Accordingly, the trial court erred in incorporating it into the final decree of divorce.
