Howard King, a resident of Florida, lived in a Fayetteville, Georgia, apartment provided by his employer, appellant Ray Bell Construction Company, while he was employed as a superintendent of a construction project in Jackson, Georgia. King died in Georgia on Monday, August 12, 2002, from injuries he had sustained in a vehicular collision the previous day that occurred in Georgia while King was driving a truck provided by his employer as a term and condition of employment. When King’s former wife sought dependency benefits for King’s dependent minor child, the employer and its insurer controverted the claim on the ground that King’s death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The administrative law judge awarded benefits to the child, based in part on the doctrine of “continuous employment,” and the State Board of Workers’ Compensation affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Superior Court of Monroe County affirmed the decision, as did the Court of Appeals in Ray Bell Const. Co. v. King , 277 Ga. App. 144 625 SE2d 541 2006. We granted the employer’s petition for a writ of certiorari because we were concerned whether the Court of Appeals had applied the two-pronged test for a compensable injury reiterated in Mayor & Aldermen &c v. Stevens , 278 Ga. 166 1 598 SE2d 456 2004: the injury by accident must arise in the course of employment and out of the course of employment, “two independent and distinct criteria. . . .” See also OCGA § 34-9-14. “The Workers’ Compensation Act in Georgia is intended to have broad application so as to cover a wide variety of injuries and the pain and suffering incident to such injuries.” Hennly v. Richardson , 264 Ga. 355 1 444 SE2d 317 1994. It is “a humanitarian measure which should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose.” City of Waycross v. Holmes , 272 Ga. 488, 489 532 SE2d 90 2000. See also New Amsterdam Casualty v. Sumrell , 30 Ga. App. 682, 689 118 SE 786 1923 The Workers’ Compensation Act “should be liberally and broadly construed to effect its beneficent purpose.” “In reviewing a workers’ compensation award, both the appellate court and the superior court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing before the appellate division of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation. Cit.. ‘It is axiomatic that the findings of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding. . . .’ Cit..” South Georgia Timber Co. v. Petty , 218 Ga. App. 497, 498 462 SE2d 176 1995. See also Young v. Columbus Consolidated Gov ‘ t. , 263 Ga. 172 1 430 SE2d 7 1993. This Court is without authority to substitute itself as a fact-finding body when reviewing a workers’ compensation decision. Hallisey v. Fort Howard Paper Co. , 268 Ga. 57 1 484 SE2d 653 1997; Southwire Co. v. George , 266 Ga. 739, 742 470 SE2d 865 1996.
The appellate division of the State Workers’ Compensation Board determined King suffered a compensable injury because, at the time the injury was sustained, King was an employee in continuous employment driving an employer-provided vehicle who had concluded a personal mission and had resumed the employer’s business because he was driving to either his job site or to his employer-provided housing. In light of the appellate division’s statement in the disjunctive of its finding regarding King’s destination at the time of injury, in reviewing the appellate division’s award we examine whether King was covered if he were driving to the job site and if he were returning to his employer-provided housing.
