Psychologist John Edward Farrar sued attorney James J. Macie, Macie’s wife, Mary Ann Macie, and Macie’s paralegal, Marsha Dryden, seeking damages arising out of the alleged tortious interference by the defendants with Farrar’s business relations, contracts, trade and profession. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and Farrar appeals. We affirm because Macie is immune from civil liability for his communication to the State Board of Examiners of Psychologists “State Board” and because the defendants showed a lack of evidence as to Farrar’s claim that they distributed a flyer which harmed Farrar’s business. To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff’s case. Emphasis omitted. Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins , 261 Ga. 491 405 SE2d 474 1991. We review an appeal from a grant of summary judgment de novo, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Costrini v. Hansen Architects, P.C. , 247 Ga. App. 136 543 SE2d 760 2000. So viewed, the evidence shows that Macie often encountered Farrar as a testifying expert in child custody cases. On December 15, 2000, Macie wrote to the State Board concerning three cases in which Farrar had given testimony. Dryden typed the letter, but neither Dryden nor Mary Ann Macie were involved in composing the correspondence. The State Board investigated Farrar and issued a final decision on October 16, 2003. The State Board found Farrar had violated its rules and ordered that he suspend all testimony in custody and certain other cases for a minimum of one year beginning November 1, 2003.1 Farrar filed this action on November 16, 2006, seeking damages arising out of Macie’s filing of complaints with the State Board and the alleged dissemination of a publication by the defendants in February of 2003.
1. Although not separately enumerated as error, Farrar complains that the trial court referred to depositions that were not on file at the time of the trial court’s order. In their motion for summary judgment, defendants referred to numerous exhibits, including transcripts of Farrar’s deposition. As supplemented, the record shows that these exhibits, including copies of the deposition transcripts, were filed with the trial court. The trial court was entitled to rely thereon. See Village Auto Ins. Co. v. Rush , 286 Ga. App. 688, 693 5 649 SE2d 862 2007; Jacobsen v. Muller , 181 Ga. App. 382, 383 3 352 SE2d 604 1986.
