Following a trial by jury, William Stack Jones was found guilty of reckless conduct OCGA § 16-5-60 b, reckless driving OCGA § 40-6-390, and speeding OCGA § 40-6-181 b 5, all misdemeanors. He was sentenced to 12 months in confinement, with a total of 20 days to serve and the balance on probation. Jones appeals1 from the conviction and the trial court’s denial of his motion for new trial, contending that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to give, sua sponte, a jury charge on justification. We find that there was no evidence to support such a charge; accordingly, we affirm. Two witnesses testified at trial: Cobb County Police Officer James Dahlquist and Jones himself. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,2 the evidence showed that around noon on November 26, 2008, Dahlquist, a P. O. S. T.-certified officer with 14 years experience, while on duty in a marked police car, observed a Jaguar traveling on Interstate 285 westbound, just past the exit for Interstate 75, in the far right of three lanes of travel. The Jaguar was approaching the point where the far right lane ends by merging into the middle lane and the road narrows to two lanes. Dahlquist testified that, by his visual estimate, the Jaguar was traveling at 100 mph; and that, when measured by Dahlquist’s laser speed-detection device, the Jaguar’s speed was 103 mph. The speed limit on 285 at that location is 55 mph. Dahlquist made a traffic stop and pulled the Jaguar over. He then determined that the driver was Jones, and that Jones’s 14-year-old son was a passenger in the right front seat of the car. Jones admitted to Dahlquist that he knew that the speed limit was 55, but he said he did not know how fast he had been traveling. Dahlquist placed Jones under arrest for speeding and reckless driving. Jones was later charged by accusation with those two offenses, as well as with the offense of reckless conduct.
Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial, because the trial court failed to give, sua sponte, a jury charge on his sole defense of justification.3 Jones relies upon Tarvestad v. State ,4 which sets forth the principle that “the trial court must charge the jury on the defendant’s sole defense, even without a written request, if there is some evidence to support the charge.”5 Where there is no evidence to support a justification defense, however, the rule stated in Tarvestad is not applicable:6 “a charge on the defendant’s sole defense is mandatory only if there is some evidence to support the charge.”7 Moreover, “whether the evidence presented is sufficient to authorize the giving of a charge is a question of law.”8
