A jury found Travis Cental Glover guilty of the malice murder of Willie Alexander. The trial court entered judgment of conviction on that guilty verdict and sentenced Glover to life imprisonment. A motion for new trial was denied almost eleven years after it was filed, and Glover appeals. 1. Construed most strongly in support of the verdict, the evidence, including the testimony of eyewitnesses, shows that Glover, who had just argued with a young woman about an alleged love affair with someone else, approached the victim as he walked down the street and asked him for a cigarette. When the victim said that he did not have one, Glover began chasing and shooting the unarmed victim. While the victim lay on the ground bleeding, Glover cursed him, continued to shoot him, and kicked him. Glover then fled, and the victim died of seven gunshot wounds from the same gun. Glover later admitted to one of the witnesses that he had shot the victim because he was mad. The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Glover was guilty of murder. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U. S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979; Curry v. State , 283 Ga. 99, 100 1 657 SE2d 218 2008.
2. Glover contends that the trial court erroneously failed to conduct a hearing on his notice of intent to introduce prior acts of violence by the victim against third parties and thus made no ruling as the admissibility thereof. Uniform Superior Court Rule USCR 31.6 B requires the trial court to hear and rule on such evidence at a time within its discretion, either before or during trial. Spencer v. State , 287 Ga. 434, 437-438 2 c 696 SE2d 617 2010. However, USCR 31.6 B also places on the defendant the burden of proving the admissibility of specific acts of violence by the victim. Spencer v. State , supra at 436 2 a. Furthermore, “the defendant may present during the trial evidence of only those specific acts of violence by the victim specifically approved by the judge.” USCR 31.6 B. At no time, however, did Glover’s trial counsel either request a hearing on the notice of intent under Rule 31.6 or seek to introduce the related evidence at trial. ” ‘Under our law, counsel must obtain rulings on his motions or objections, and the failure to do so ordinarily results in a waiver.’ Cit.” Brown v. State , 307 Ga. App. 99, 105 3 b 704 SE2d 227 2010. See also Overton v. State , 270 Ga. App. 285, 289 2 606 SE2d 306 2004. Accordingly, we hold that Glover waived his right to the hearing and ruling required by USCR 31.6. Compare Brown v. State , supra at 103 2 b; Sheppard v. State , 294 Ga. App. 270, 273 3 669 SE2d 152 2008 where similar transaction evidence was subject of State’s notice of intent and was admitted without a hearing, defendant bore no burden to initiate USCR 31.3 B procedures, and his failure to object to the absence of such procedures did not constitute a waiver.
