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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Law enforcement officers with the Chisholm Trail Narcotics Task Force received information that Dexter Leon Hedspeth Jr. and Christina Ann Mackey had been trafficking in crack cocaine out of their motel room in Lockhart for approximately two months. Using a confidential informant, the officers conducted a controlled buy of the drug from Hedspeth. Based on an affidavit enumerating the results of their ongoing investigation, on April 13, 2005, the officers applied for and obtained a search warrant for room 217 of the Lockhart Inn Motel. While the affidavit listed Hedspeth’s cars as “suspected places” to be searched, the search warrant identified only the motel room as a “suspected place” to be searched. As probable cause set forth in the affidavit accompanying the search-warrant application, Lockhart police officer Neal Rogers averred in part: “It is common for individuals who deal in illegal controlled substances to secrete contraband, proceeds of drug sales, and records of drug transactions in secure locations within their residence and/or motor vehicles for ready access and to conceal such items from law enforcement authorities.” The affidavit identified Hedspeth and Mackey as the individuals in control of the premises. The probable cause on which the search warrant was based included information provided by employees at the motel as well as a confidential informant who had made a controlled buy from Hedspeth at the motel. On April 16, the officers executed the search warrant. Hedspeth and Mackey were in the Lockhart Inn motel room at the time. During the course of the search, the officers seized car keys from a table in the room. Hedspeth confirmed that the keys were his and that his vehicle was parked downstairs in the parking lot. Hedspeth told the officers that he was renting the car. In the ensuing search of his car, a 1995 white Pontiac Grand Am, the officers found approximately 16 grams of crack cocaine under the driver’s seat of the vehicle. The officers placed Hedspeth under arrest. In a voluntary statement not challenged here, Hedspeth stated that the cocaine was his. The warrant, with attached affidavit, was received in evidence at a suppression hearing which included the testimony of Rogers and another officer, Jesus Hernandez, who participated in the execution of the search. Rogers testified that, as part of the investigation of Hedspeth, the officers had observed Hedspeth driving a 1995 white Pontiac Grand Am. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court overruled Hedspeth’s motion to suppress, and Hedspeth pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession of cocaine. This appeal followed. HOLDING:Affirmed. Hedspeth complained that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress, because no probable cause existed for the search of the vehicle, and the officers exceeded the scope of the search warrant in searching Hedspeth’s vehicle. Hedspeth argued that, because the motel parking lot is a common lot with no designated parking spaces, there was no way to know which car belonged to him. The court stated: “The question, then, is whether the inclusion of the reference in the affidavit to”any and all vehicles owned and or controlled by’ appellant”which are located on the property named’ in the warrant is sufficiently particularized to uphold the search of appellant’s vehicle.” The court held that it was. Courts, the court stated, have generally allowed the search of an automobile found on the premises under the terms of a search warrant authorizing a search of only the residence or premises. Likewise, search warrants for premises and vehicles that can be identified by the description in the warrant have also generally been upheld. Considering the affidavit as a whole and the reasonable inferences it supported, the court found that a substantial basis existed to support a finding of probable cause for the search of Hedspeth’s vehicle. Information contained in the affidavit eliminated the possibility that the wrong vehicle would be searched pursuant to the warrant. The facts that can be derived from the four corners of the affidavit, the court stated, included sufficient information to support a search of Hedspeth’s vehicle. Absent any claim that the search of the premises was invalid, the court further concluded that the search of the vehicle on the parking lot was within the scope of the warrant. Because probable cause supported the search of the premises, as a matter of law it also supported the search of the vehicle, which was adequately described in the affidavit. OPINION:Patterson, J.; Patterson, Puryear and Henson, JJ.

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