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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:L.M.M. was born on Aug. 7, 1998. Michelle Wright and Gary Murtha, L.M.M.’s parents, were not married. On Aug. 12, 1998, Wright filed a petition to establish the parent-child relationship between L.M.M. and Murtha and to obtain the appointment of a managing conservator. On March 12, 1999, the trial court entered judgment establishing the parent-child relationship between Murtha and L.M.M., naming Murtha and Wright joint managing conservators, and giving Wright the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of L.M.M. On June 23, 2006, Murtha filed a petition to modify, seeking to be named sole managing conservator or, alternatively, to be named the joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of L.M.M. The parties subsequently participated in mediation and reached a settlement agreement pursuant to which Murtha was named the joint managing conservator with the exclusive right to determine the primary residence of L.M.M. and given the exclusive right to determine the primary religious faith of L.M.M. The mediated settlement agreement (MSA), signed by Wright and Murtha and their respective attorneys, was filed with the court on March 29, 2007. Wright fired the attorney who had represented her through the mediation and hired a new attorney. On April 3, 2007, Wright filed a motion for new trial and supplemental motion for new trial, seeking to withdraw her consent to the MSA. On April 13, 2007, the trial court entered a final order incorporating the terms of the MSA. Wright appealed. HOLDING:Affirmed. In her first issue, Wright contended that the trial court erred in rendering judgment based on the MSA, because, after Wright withdrew her consent to the agreement, Murtha failed to plead and prove an underlying claim for breach of contract. In a related argument, Wright asserted in her second issue that legally insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s order, because a “party seeking enforcement of a written settlement agreement as a contract must support it by proof.” Texas Family Code �153.0071 addresses alternative dispute resolution in suits affecting the parent-child relationship. A mediated settlement agreement is binding on the parties if the agreement: 1. provides, in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation; 2. is signed by each party to the agreement; and 3. is signed by the party’s attorney, if any, who is present at the time the agreement is signed. If the settlement agreement meets the statutory requirements, then a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated settlement agreement. In this case, the court noted that the MSA stated on the front page that it complied with �153.0071(d) and, in bold, underlined, all capital letters provided: “THE PARTIES ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE BY THEIR SIGNATURE HEREIN THAT THIS AGREEMENT IS BINDING AND NOT SUBJECT TO REVOCATION AND IS ENFORCEABLE BY A COURT OF COMPETENT JURISDICTION.” Both Wright and her attorney signed the agreement. Thus, the court concluded that the MSA met the statutory requirements of �153.0071(d). Therefore, Murtha was not required to file a separate breach of contract action to enforce the MSA and was not required to present evidence in support of a breach of contract claim. The court also found that Wright waived her constitutional challenge to the MSA. In her third and fourth issues, Wright contended that the judgment should be reversed because: 1. her attorney acted beyond the scope of his authority and against her wishes, and Wright withdrew her consent to the MSA; and 2. the judgment did not conform to the MSA, was entered without the approval of Wright’s attorney and constituted hearsay. But the court concluded that Wright waived issues three and four because of inadequate briefing. In her fifth issue, Wright contended that the trial court’s order was unconstitutional, because it gave Murtha the exclusive right to establish L.M.M.’s primary religious faith. The mother claimed that L.M.M. was a practicing Catholic, and the order “strip[s] the mother’s and child’s right[s] to continue to practice their faith and would require the child to practice the current faith of the father (currently Baptist)” in violation of the U.S. and Texas constitutions. Constitutional rights, the court stated, can be waived. Wright agreed in the MSA that Murtha would have the exclusive right to determine L.M.M.’s primary religious faith. Because the MSA met the statutory requirements, the court held that the trial court had no discretion but to enter an order incorporating the agreed terms. OPINION:Thomas, C.J.; Thomas, C.J., and Bridges and FitzGerald, JJ.

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