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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A.A.A. was born April 13, 2005. During the summer of 2005, her mother Shde Hurst was living in Louisiana with her boyfriend Paul Alexander. Alexander claims that he is A.A.A.’s father, although DNA test results were not available at trial. In September 2005, Hurst ended her relationship with Alexander, after living with him for six months. She and A.A.A. moved to a Houston shelter. After arriving at the shelter, Hurst worked at McDonald’s for about one month and also began attending night school. On Jan. 24, 2006, Hurst left 8-month-old A.A.A. at the shelter and went to Wal-Mart. While at Wal-Mart, Hurst was arrested for shoplifting and spent two days in a Harris County jail. Hurst claims that she was shoplifting cough medicine, because A.A.A. was sick. On Jan. 25, 2006, when Hurst did not return to the shelter, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) received a referral of neglectful supervision of A.A.A. DFPS attempted to reach the contacts on Hurst’s emergency list, but, when no one on the emergency list could be reached who could care for A.A.A., A.A.A. was taken into DFPS care. On Jan. 26, 2006, DFPS filed a petition for protection of a child, conservatorship and termination of the parent-child relationship, and the trial court issued a temporary order naming DFPS as A.A.A.’s temporary sole managing conservator. DFPS initially placed A.A.A. in foster care, but, in May 2006, A.A.A. was moved to Hurst’s relative. This relative has expressed an interest in adopting A.A.A. The jail released Hurst on Jan. 25, 2006, at 5:55 p.m. She testified that, by the time she was released, DFPS had already had possession of A.A.A. for one day. After being released, Hurst moved to another shelter in Pasadena for a few weeks and then moved in with a friend in Houston until sometime in June. Hurst claimed that she worked at McDonald’s during this period, although A.A.A.’s guardian ad litem testified that Hurst told her she had been working at the McDonald’s for about three weeks as of June 1. In June, Hurst moved back to Louisiana where she moved back and forth between Alexander and her sick mother, whom she assisted. Once back in Louisiana, Hurst stated that she babysat two children, ages 7 and 9, for around seven months and was making about $300 every two weeks. A.A.A. remained in Texas with Hurst’s relative. At the time of trial, Hurst testified that she was currently living with Alexander at an apartment in Lake Charles, where she planned on staying and where she has daycare for A.A.A. She also stated that she was working at a Citgo gas station making $7.25 an hour. A family service plan was implemented, which outlined the services Hurst was to complete in order to be reunited with A.A.A. Hurst signed this plan on March 9, 2006. On March 23, 2006, the trial court ordered Hurst to comply with the plan. Brandi Sewell-Hall, the appointed caseworker on A.A.A.’s case from January 2006 until December 2006, testified that, while DFPS tried to help her to complete her services, Hurst failed to comply with the services outlined in the plan, except for completing a psychological evaluation. Sewell-Hall also stated that during the year she was the assigned caseworker, Hurst only visited A.A.A. twice, even though she could have visited twice a month while A.A.A. was in foster care and even more often once Hurst’s relative obtained custody of A.A.A. Hurst testified that she left a message on Sewell-Hall’s answering machine indicating that she was moving to Louisiana. Sewell-Hall, however, stated that she did not remember the message. Elizabeth Bolling, the assigned caseworker from Jan. 19, 2007 until the time of trial, testified that Hurst only saw A.A.A. once during that time. Bolling stated that it was in A.A.A.’s best interest to remain with Hurst’s relative. A.A.A.’s guardian ad litem testified that A.A.A. had bonded with Hurst’s relative and was thriving in her current environment. Hurst testified that her failure to comply with the family service plan was due to transportation problems and the unavailability of parenting classes, although she testified at trial that she made a choice not to catch the bus to attend the parenting classes. She also testified that she completed the parenting classes days before trial and just needed to pick up the certificate. Hurst testified that she visited A.A.A. six times before she moved back to Louisiana. She also stated that she called A.A.A. every day after she moved to Louisiana. Hurst claimed that she did not visit A.A.A. more frequently when A.A.A. was in her relative’s care, because she believed she could only visit A.A.A. at the CPS office. Bolling confirmed that Hurst had stated that she believed all visits with A.A.A. were to be at the CPS office. While Hurst admitted that she did not provide financial support for A.A.A. after she was taken into DFPS care, Hurst testified that she brought clothing and shoes to the CPS office approximately six times. DFPS petitioned to have Hurst’s parental rights terminated on Jan. 26, 2006. Permanency hearings occurred on July 27, 2006, Nov. 14, 2006, and on Feb. 6, 2007. A bench trial occurred on DFPS’ parental-termination suit on Feb. 6, 2007, and, on Feb. 27, the trial court signed a judgment terminating Hurst’s and Alexander’s parent-child relationship with A.A.A. and appointing DFPS as A.A.A.’s sole managing conservator. On appeal, Hurst challenged the trial court’s termination of her parental rights, because legally and factually insufficient evidence supported: the termination of her parental rights pursuant to Texas Family Code �161.001(1)(E), (F), (N) and (O); and the trial court’s finding that termination was in the best interest of the child pursuant �161.001(2). HOLDING:Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part. Because parental-rights termination, the court stated, “is complete, final, irrevocable, and divests for all time that natural right . . . [,] the evidence in support of termination must be clear and convincing before a court may involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights.” In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under �161.001, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated under Subsection (1) of �161.001 and that termination is in the best interest of the child under Subsection (2). In terminating Hurst’s parental relationship with A.A.A., the trial court found that Hurst: 1. engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child at issue in this suit with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being, pursuant to �161.001(1)(E); 2. failed to support the child in accordance with her ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition, pursuant to �161.001(1)(F); 3. constructively abandoned the child at issue in the suit pursuant to �161.001(1)(N); and 4. failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the child pursuant to �161.001(1)(O). In addition, the court found that termination of Hurst’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Hurst challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of these findings. First, the court held that legally insufficient evidence supported a finding that Hurst engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of A.A.A. Second, the court found that because A.A.A. was born on April 13, 2005, less then a year before Jan. 26, 2006, the day DFPS filed its petition for termination, Hurst could not have failed to support A.A.A. for a period of 12 months before. Thus, the court held that legally insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Hurst violated �161.001(1)(F). Third, the court found that DFPS failed to show Hurt’s constructive abandonment of A.A.A.. Although DFPS initially removed A.A.A. from Hurst while she was in jail for shoplifting, the court found this episode to be an isolated incident insufficient to constitute conduct which endangered A.A.A.’s physical or emotional well-being under �161.001(1)(E) and likewise held that it was not enough to demonstrate that Hurst was unable to provide a safe environment A.A.A. Therefore, the court found legally insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s determination that Hurst constructively abandoned A.A.A. under �161.001(1)(N). As for the trial court’s finding that Hurst failed to comply with the provisions of a court order, Hurst did not dispute that A.A.A. was in DFPS custody for at least nine months or that she did not comply with all the requirements of her family service plan. Instead, she argued that DFPS could not meet its burden of proof under �161.001(1)(O), because A.A.A. was not removed from her as a result of abuse or neglect but solely because she had been arrested and was unable to return to A.A.A. at the shelter. The court agreed, finding insufficient evidence of abuse or neglect to support termination under �161.001(1)(O). Because the court held that insufficient evidence supported the trial court’s findings under �161.001(1), it did not review the sufficiency of the trial court’s finding that termination was in A.A.A.’s best interest. Finally, the court found that Hurst failed to preserve her issue challenging the appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator. OPINION:Hanks, J.; Taft, Hanks and Higley, JJ.

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