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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Authorities arrested Roy James Coffel for driving while intoxicated and later charged him with DWI, second offense, under Texas Penal Code ��49.04 and 49.09. The state and Coffel agreed to a pretrial discovery order in which, among other things, the state agreed “to provide the cause number, court of jurisdiction, date of conviction, and offense for all extraneous offenses that resulted in a conviction or order of community supervision of which the State intends to present at trial at least ten (10) days prior to trial.” The state also agreed “to provide the date, crime, name of crime victim, and county of offense for all extraneous offenses that did not result in a conviction or order of community supervision and that the State intends to present at trial at least ten (10) days prior to trial.” Coffel was tried during the week of May 14, 2007. Before the trial on April 12, 2007, however, the state filed its Notice of Intention To Use Extraneous Offenses And Prior Convictions. Included in that filing was a specific provision indicating that the state intended to introduce at trial evidence that on or about Feb. 21, 1996, a trial court convicted Coffel “of the offense of Driving While Intoxicated in the County Criminal Courts #7 Court of Dallas County, Texas, in cause number MB9522721H.” In his 2007 trial, the reporter’s record suggested that the state did indeed bring forth the previous conviction evidence at trial. The record further suggested the state’s evidence showed: that Coffel received community supervision in that case; that he committed several technical violations of his conditions of community supervision; and that the trial court ultimately revoked that community supervision on the basis of one or more of those technical violations. The trial court convicted Coffel of DWI second offense. On appeal, Coffel contended that the trial court erred by admitting testimony about those technical violations of the 1996 community supervision, because the state’s April 2007 notice failed to provide additional notice of the state’s intent to introduce such evidence at Coffel’s May 2007 trial. HOLDING:Affirmed. Community supervision, the court stated, is “the placement of a defendant by a court under a continuum of programs and sanctions, with conditions imposed by the court for a specified period” of time that generally results in the suspension of a sentence of imprisonment or confinement. On proof that the defendant has violated one of the terms of that probated sentence, the trial court may, at a proper revocation hearing, either continue the probationer’s community supervision or revoke the probationer’s community release. The 6th Court of Appeals’ appellate jurisprudence, the court stated, has generally divided violation allegations into two categories: “technical” violations and “new offense or new crime” violations. “Technical” violations, the court stated, are typically those that involve the probationer’s failure to report to the probation officer as directed by the trial court, pay various community supervision fees, perform community service at the specified rate or obey other conditions that have nothing to do with obeying “the laws of this State or of any other State or of the United States.” New offense violations, the court stated, concern the defendant’s alleged criminal violation of Texas law or laws of another state. Coffel, the court stated, contended that all community supervision violations “technical” and “new offense” violations are extraneous offenses under Texas law. Under such a rubric, Coffel contended the state was required to file written notice of its intent to introduce the 1996 technical violations of Coffel’s earlier community supervision before such would be admissible in his 2007 prosecution. The court, however, disagreed with the proposition. Texas Penal Code �1.03, the court noted, states: “Conduct does not constitute an offense unless it is defined as an offense by statute, municipal ordinance, order of a county commissioners court, or rule authorized by and lawfully adopted under a statute.” None of the provisions of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42.12 (the statute outlining the general conditions of community supervision to be imposed by a trial court) have been designated by the Legislature as outlining crimes or “offenses,” the court stated. Thus, the court stated, to the extent Coffel sought to characterize “technical” violations of community supervision as new offenses, and thereby require the state to provide pretrial notice of its intent to introduce evidence regarding technical community supervision violations in a future prosecution pursuant to Art. 37.07 or Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), Coffel’s argument lacked support in Texas statutes and caselaw. Without support via statute or caselaw, the court could not say the trial court abused its discretion by overruling Coffel’s objection and by concluding the state was not required to provide advance pretrial notice of the state’s intent to introduce evidence of Coffel’s technical violations of a previous community supervision. OPINION:Moseley, J.; Morriss, C.J., and Carter and Moseley, JJ.

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