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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In February 2002, a Johnson County grand jury returned an indictment charging Rebecca Ann Shaw with one count of injury to a child and one count of manslaughter. The indictment alleged, in relevant part, that Rebecca, by “shaking [Schuyler Bryce Shaw, a child younger than 15 years of age,] and causing his head to strike an unknown object,” had intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to him (count one, paragraph one), had recklessly caused serious bodily injury to him (count one, paragraph two) and had recklessly caused his death (count two). In July 2003, the state brought Rebecca to trial before a jury on her plea of not guilty. At the guilt stage of trial, the state presented 10 witnesses and a few exhibits, and Rebecca presented one witness (herself) and a few exhibits. In summary, the thrust of the state’s evidence was that on Nov. 9, 2001, 10-week-old Schuyler sustained massive brain injuries, which ultimately caused his death; those brain injuries were the result of deliberate, severe shaking or blunt-force trauma; the most serious brain injury, the subarachnoid hemorrhage, occurred within six hours of the severe shaking or blunt-force trauma; given the circumstances, only Rebecca was in a position to have caused the injuries; Rebecca shook or struck Schuyler out of anger or frustration, because he kept crying and would not go to sleep; and Rebecca concocted a story involving her daughter Melissa with which to explain the baby’s injuries. In contrast, the thrust of Rebecca’s evidence was simply that: on Nov. 9, 2001, at around 2:15 p.m., she found Schuyler, who had an abnormal heart, in a nonresponsive state; she immediately telephoned 911 and, shortly thereafter, began cardiopulmonary resuscitation. At the charge conference, Rebecca asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the Good Samaritan defense provided by Texas Penal Code �22.04(k)(1)(B) (later recodified, with its text unchanged, as Texas Penal Code �22.04(k)(2)). Rebecca did not explain to the trial court how the evidence at trial supported the requested special charge; she simply urged the trial court to “recall the testimony.” The state argued in response that there was no evidence to support the requested special charge. The trial court denied Rebecca’s request. The jury subsequently found Rebecca not guilty of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to Schuyler but found her guilty of recklessly causing serious bodily injury to him. The jury assessed Rebecca’s punishment at imprisonment for 20 years and a fine of $10,000. On direct appeal, Rebecca brought a single point of error, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her requested special charge on the Good Samaritan defense. In particular, Rebecca argued that the “Pediatric Neurology Consultation” report by Dr. Angel Hernandez, introduced into evidence by the state, “raised the defensive issue that Rebecca’s attempt to save her grandson’s life may have, in fact, tragically [ended] it.” In that report, Hernandez expressed the view that Schuyler’s “subarachnoid hemorrhagic is probably the result of aggressive, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation, although [he could] not rule out the possibility of a non-accidental trauma.” The state’s response to Rebecca’s argument was threefold. First, the state argued that the trial court did not err in denying the requested jury instruction, because there was no evidence in the record to raise same. Second, the state argued that, in any event, the trial court could not be faulted for denying the requested instruction because “defense counsel failed his duty of informing the trial court where [in the record] the evidence was that supported [the] requested jury instruction.” Third, the state argued that, “given the overwhelming evidence that Schuyler’s injuries were not the result of aggressive CPR, it is inconceivable that Rebecca suffered any harm from the trial court’s denial of the requested jury instruction.” The 10th Court of Appeals, by a 2-1 vote, overruled Rebecca’s point of error and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The 10th Court explained that, “[b]ecause a rational juror could not have found that Shaw’s conduct in shaking the baby and hitting its head against an object was reasonable emergency medical care or that Shaw was not licensed in the healing arts, the defense in question was not raised.” The 10th Court did not reach the state’s other two arguments. Rebecca later filed a petition for discretionary review, which the CCA granted. In her petition and accompanying brief, Rebecca argued, inter alia, that the 10th Court, in determining whether the trial court erred in denying her requested special charge on the Good Samaritan defense, erroneously applied a rational-juror test instead of the raised-by-the-evidence test; and the 10th Court erred in holding that the evidence adduced at trial did not raise the “Good Samaritan” defense. The CCA granted Rebecca’s petition in order to decide whether the divided court of appeals correctly construed �22.04(k)(1)(B). HOLDING:Affirmed. The CCA first addressed Rebecca’s argument that the 10th Court used the wrong legal standard in determining whether the trial court erred in denying her requested special charge on the Good Samaritan defense. In Texas Penal Code �2.03(c), the Legislature mandated that “[t]he issue of the existence of a defense is not submitted to the jury unless evidence is admitted supporting the defense.” For the purposes of �2.03(c), the CCA noted, a defense is supported by the evidence if there is some evidence, from any source, on each element of the defense that, if believed by the jury, would support a rational inference that that element is true. If a defense is supported by the evidence, the CCA stated, then the defendant is entitled to an instruction on that defense, even if the evidence supporting the defense is weak or contradicted and even if the trial court is of the opinion that the evidence is not credible. But the evidence must be such that it will support a rational jury finding as to each element of the defense. Thus, the CCA held that the 10th Court utilized the correct legal standard. The CCA then turned to Rebecca’s argument that the 10th Court erred in holding that the evidence adduced at trial did not raise the Good Samaritan defense. Section 22.04, the CCA stated, provides, in relevant part, that “[a] person commits an offense if he . . . recklessly . . . by act . . . causes to a child . . . serious bodily injury.” The statute goes on to provide that “[i]t is a defense to prosecution under this section that the act . . . consisted of . . . emergency medical care administered in good faith and with reasonable care by a person not licensed in the healing arts.” This Good Samaritan defense is a confession-and-avoidance or “justification” type of defense, the CCA stated. Justification does not negate any element of the offense, including culpable intent; it only excuses what would otherwise constitute criminal conduct. Thus, evidence in a prosecution for injury to a child that does no more than negate an inference that the defendant caused the injury without a culpable state of mind does not raise the defense, the CCA stated. In the instant case, the CCA stated that Rebecca would be entitled to the “Good Samaritan” defense under �22.04(k) only if the jury could have found that it was this particular act that actually caused the child’s head injury. Hernandez’s preliminary medical report concluded that the head injury “is probably the result of aggressive, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation[.]” Hence, the CCA found some evidence from which the jury could reasonably have found (but was certainly not required to find) that it was Rebecca’s attempted CPR that caused the head injury. The next question, the CCA stated, is what the evidence showed Rebecca’s mental state was, if any, specifically with respect to allegedly causing the head injury in that particular way. If there was no indication, the CCA stated, that she harbored any culpable mental state with respect to causing the child’s head injury while administering the CPR, she would not be entitled to the defensive instruction. Rebecca pointed to no evidence in the record from which it could rationally be inferred that she harbored some culpable mental state with respect to causing a head injury in the course of administering CPR. There was only Hernandez’s initial conclusion in his written report that it could have been the CPR that actually caused the head injury. This defensive posture, the CCA stated, served only to negate the culpable mental element of the offense. Under these circumstances, a charge to the jury requiring it to find every constituent element of the offense to a level of confidence beyond a reasonable doubt before convicting Rebecca was all that was required. Accordingly, the CCA held that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit the defensive instruction to the jury. OPINION:Price, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Keller, P.J., and Meyers, Keasler, hervey and Cochran, JJ., joined. DISSENT:Johnson, J., filed a dissenting opinion. “Because the jury determined that Schuyler’s injuries were not inflicted intentionally or knowingly, it is conceivable that the jury, had it been told of the Good Samaritan defense, might have found for the appellant on that basis. Therein lies the harm to appellant. “Appellant was entitled to a charge on the Good Samaritan defense. She did not get such an instruction and was harmed by its lack. The conviction should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. I respectfully dissent.” Holcomb, J., filed a dissenting opinion. “The jury at appellant’s trial found that she was reckless when she injured her grandson, Schuyler Shaw. After reviewing the record, I conclude that, if the jury had been given the option, it might well have found that appellant’s reckless injury of Schuyler occurred during the course of emergency medical care administered in good faith and with reasonable care.” Womack, J., dissented without a written opinion.

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