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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On Aug. 29, 2005, authorities arrested Basil Labib and charged him with forgery by counterfeiting money. That evening, a magistrate found probable cause for the further detention of Labib and set his bail at $5,000. The following day, the trial court appointed an attorney for Labib, who pleaded guilty to the charges pursuant to a plea bargain with the state, the terms of which the trial court accepted. In his plea of guilty, Labib signed admonishments that included waivers of the right to indictment, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to “any further time to prepare for trial to which I or my attorney may be entitled.” Labib also asserted, as part of the waiver, that” I am satisfied that the attorney representing me today in court has properly represented me and I have fully discussed this case with him.” In a written admonishment by the court, Labib signed his initials to the following statements: “I have freely, knowingly, and voluntarily executed this statement in open court with the consent of and approval of my attorney. . . . If my counsel was appointed, I waive and give up any time provided me by law to prepare for trial. I am totally satisfied with the representation provided by my counsel and I received effective and competent representation.” Labib’s trial attorney also signed a waiver. The trial court admonished Labib about the consequences of pleading guilty at a hearing that was recorded by the court reporter. The record shows that the trial court admonished Labib of the consequences of his guilty plea. In response to questioning by the trial court, Labib also told the court that he desired that the court follow the plea bargain agreement, that he understood his rights as explained by his attorney, that he understood what was transpiring in court and that he understood the consequences of his plea. Before accepting the plea of guilty, the trial court asked Labib questions that resulted in responses that indicated that Labib personally signed the plea papers and that he signed the papers after obtaining the advice of counsel. Labib also told the trial court that he understood that by signing the plea papers he was waiving his rights and giving up his rights to a trial by jury, including the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. In addition, Labib responded affirmatively when the trial court asked him whether he understood that by signing the plea papers he was admitting that he committed the offense. The trial court found Labib’s plea was freely and voluntarily made and accepted the plea of guilty. The trial court entered an “order deferring adjudication of guilt” on August 30, 2005. Within 30 days of the order, on Sept. 26, 2005, Labib filed a motion in arrest of judgment, citing Rules 22.2(a)-(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The motion in arrest of judgment asserted that the trial court’s judgment was contrary to the law and invalid, because the plea of guilty was involuntary due to coercive influences and ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the charging instrument was defective” since it alleged an offense of forgery . . . without alleging the manner of the intent to utter element.” Labib concurrently filed a motion to withdraw guilty plea, in which he claimed that his plea was not freely and voluntarily entered on the grounds that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In an affidavit, Labib claimed that he hesitated to accept the plea deal, but his attorney advised him that he would have to accept the offer and plead guilty in order to get the deferred adjudication. Fearing that he would not be able to get anyone to post his bail and feeling that it was his only option, Labib finally accepted the offer of 180 days of imprisonment. On Sept. 29, 2005, Labib filed a timely notice of appeal within 30 days of being placed on deferred adjudication. Thirteen days after Labib gave notice of appeal, the trial court amended its certification by stating that this” is a plea-bargain case, but the trial court has given permission to appeal, and the defendant has a right of appeal.” On Oct. 17, 2005, within 75 days of the trial court’s order that placed Labib on deferred adjudication, the trial court ordered that the “motion for new trial is overruled” and that the” motion to [withdraw] guilty plea overruled.” The trial court’s order did not specify a ruling on the motion in arrest of judgment, which was then denied by operation of law. HOLDING:Affirmed. In his first issue, Labib asserted that his guilty plea was rendered involuntarily and unknowingly, because he did not receive effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Labib contended that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, because his court-appointed counsel: 1. did not adequately investigate the relevant law or facts; 2. erroneously advised Labib regarding how long it would take before his case could be heard at a trial; and 3. pressured Labib into pleading guilty. The court evaluated the record to determine whether Labib’s plea was voluntary. A record that indicates that the trial court properly admonished the defendant, the court stated, presents a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was made voluntarily and knowingly. When the record presents a prima facie showing that the plea was voluntary and knowing, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that he entered the plea without understanding the consequences. A guilty plea, the court stated, is not voluntary if made as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, because it does not represent an informed choice. The court concluded that the written and oral waivers and admonishments in the record presented a prima facie showing that the guilty plea was made voluntarily and knowingly by Labib. The court then assessed Labibs ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The only evidence of counsels purported misrepresentation � that his trial would be delayed for six months if he did not plead guilty � was Labibs affidavit testimony, the court stated. Labib’s uncorroborated testimony that he was misinformed by counsel does not meet his burden to show that his plea was involuntary. As for Labib’s claim that his attorney did not adequately investigate his case, the court stated that the record did not indicate what investigation was not done that would have been helpful for Labib or that the failure to conduct an investigation was necessarily prejudicial to him. The court stated that the record showed that Labib asserted in open court that he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily and that he had not been promised anything in return, threatened in any way or forced into making the plea. The record did not affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness brought about by counsel s action. Thus, the court could not conclude that the attorney’s assistance was ineffective. OPINION:Alcala, J.; Taft, Jennings and Alcala, JJ.

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