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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On August 28, 2003, Brumfield filed a health-care liability claim against Dr. Stephen D. Ruyle. Brumfield alleged that Ruyle provided negligent treatment and follow-up care for her fractured forearm that resulted in severe and disabling injuries to her arm. Ruyle generally denied Brumfield’s allegations and subsequently asserted that new, independent and intervening causes not reasonably foreseeable were the proximate and sole cause of Brumfield’s injuries. Pursuant to �13.01(d) of the former Art. 4590i of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, the deadline for furnishing Ruyle with an expert report and curriculum vitae demonstrating the prima facie merits of Brumfield’s health-care liability claim was Feb. 24, 2004, 180 days after she filed suit. On Jan. 13, 2004, Brumfield timely filed the report and curriculum vitae of her expert, Dr. Roby Mize. According to his curriculum vitae, Dr. Mize was a board-certified orthopedic surgeon with staff privileges at Presbyterian Medical Center and Parkland Memorial Hospital in Dallas and was a member of the faculty of the Department of Orthopedic Surgery at the University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center. In his report, Mize alleged that Ruyle breached the standard of care by failing t properly diagnose the older nature of Brumfield’s fracture from the outset; properly repair the fracture during the initial surgery; and failing to timely and properly assess and treat the repaired fracture for the known post-operative complication of infection. Mize further opined that such negligence proximately caused Brumfield to undergo multiple additional surgeries to correct the failed repair. On March 1, 2005, Ruyle filed a motion for leave to designate Dr. Jorge Valencia as a third party responsible for the injuries made the basis of Brumfield’s health-care liability claim. Ruyle argued that Valencia negligently prescribed and administered steroids to Brumfield after her initial surgery without communicating this to Ruyle, thereby inhibiting the post-operative healing process and encouraging infection to the point that the repair of the fracture failed. On March 16, 2005, Brumfield objected to Ruyle’s motion for leave, complaining that Ruyle had failed to file a proper expert report pursuant to former Art. 4590i, �13.01(d). Thereafter, on March 31, 2005, Ruyle filed his first amended motion to designate Valencia as a responsible third party, attaching Dr. Lyn D. Ward’s curriculum vitae, his original expert report and his amended expert report, which was dated March 24, 2005. The amended expert report alleged that Valencia “failed to follow the appropriate standards of care as would a physician of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances and at [sic] such failure was a proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff.” Valencia argued that Ruyle failed to put forth an opinion establishing the applicable standard of care. Nonetheless, Brumfield thereafter withdrew her objection to designating Valencia as a responsible third party, and the trial court granted the amended motion by written order on April 21, 2005. On April 25, 2005, Brumfield filed her third amended petition in which she directly asserted a health-care liability claim against Valencia. But Brumfield failed to timely furnish an expert report and curriculum vitae to Valencia. On Nov. 29, 2005, Valencia filed a motion to dismiss Brumfield’s health-care liability claim against him based on her failure to furnish a timely expert report in compliance with former Art. 4590i, �13.01(d). On Dec. 21, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. On the day of the hearing, Brumfield filed her response, arguing that she had complied with her statutory obligations because Valencia had already received the expert report and curriculum vitae of Ward, upon which she relied in adding Valencia as a defendant in her third amended petition. At the close of the hearing, the trial court ruled from the bench that former Art. 4590i, �13.01(d) placed an affirmative duty upon a health-care liability claimant to furnish an expert report and curriculum vitae to counsel for each named defendant and that it did not permit Brumfield to rely upon the actions of counsel for Ruyle or upon any other actual notice received by Valencia to meet her statutory obligation. Accordingly, the trial court granted Valencia’s motion to dismiss with prejudice and entered an order to that effect on Dec. 22, 2005. Two weeks later, the trial court granted Ruyle’s motion for summary judgment that he had filed on Nov. 4, 2005, without specifying a reason for its ruling. The court ordered that Brumfield take nothing against Ruyle. Brumfield now appealed. HOLDING:Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. First, Brumfield asserted that the trial court erred in granting Valencia’s motion to dismiss for failure to furnish an expert report to him. Brumfield contended that she substantially complied with the requirements of former Art. 4590i, because Ruyle’s motion to designate Valencia as a responsible third party resulted in Valencia possessing a copy of Ward’s report and deposition. Thus, Brumfield argued that she fulfilled the statutory requirements. The court, however, disagreed with that premise. Because Brumfield herself did not furnish a copy of the report to Valencia and did not inform him until the day of the hearing on the motion to dismiss that she intended in some way to rely on anything other than her own expert’s report, the court found that Brumfield did not fulfill the requirement of the wording of the statute. Second, Brumfield asserted that the trial court also erred in granting Ruyle’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that Valencia’s treatment of Brumfield constituted an intervening cause. The court agreed, because the case was a “classic example of”battling experts.’ ” Both sides presented experts who gave conflicting assessments regarding the cause of Brumfield’s maladies, the court stated. Therefore, the court stated that after reviewing the evidence, it held that a fact question existed as to whether any act or omission by Ruyle proximately caused Brumfield’s asserted injuries. The court further held that a fact question existed as to whether the alleged acts or omissions by Valencia were a new, independent and intervening cause of Brumfield’s asserted injury. OPINION:McCoy, J.; Livingston, Dauphinot and McCoy, JJ.

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