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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:On July 19, 2004, Jermaine Andre Grant approached two women and two men chatting in the driveway of a townhouse in Alief. He demanded their wallets and purses, and threatened them with a shotgun. When none of the four was able to produce any money, he led them inside the townhouse so that one of the women could retrieve her purse. Grant then directed them back outside, ordered them into one of the parked vehicles, and fled on foot after confiscating several cell phones. The state indicted Grant for the aggravated robbery of one of the women. All four of the eyewitnesses testified at trial, and three of them positively identified Grant as the robber. Grant’s trial counsel attempted to elicit testimony from the police officer who responded to the crime that the version of events the eyewitnesses related on the night of the robbery differed from that provided at trial. The judge, however, sustained the state’s objections that the answers to defense counsel’s questions called for hearsay and speculation. The jury convicted Grant of the charged offense. In the punishment phase of trial, the state presented evidence indicating that Grant and several other young men essentially terrorized the city of Alief during the summer of 2004. Typically, their victims were lone Asian women, some of whom spoke no English. According to the testimony, these women were Grant’s prime targets, partly because of perceived cultural mores that would make them less likely to report the crime or participate in the investigation. During these offenses, Grant commonly brandished a firearm, demanded money and usually took any cell phones present. On one occasion, when a husband and wife did not provide money quickly enough, Grant put a pistol to the neck of the couple’s one-year-old son until the couple was able to provide cash. Other testimony admitted concerned Grant’s propensity for violence and threats. The state also introduced Grant’s high school disciplinary records over Grant’s objections. During its closing argument in the punishment phase of trial, the state told the jury, “You look at Jermaine Grant’s face. You have heard all the testimony. Did you ever see any sorrowness or remorse?” Grant objected on the ground that the state improperly commented on Grant’s failure to testify. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard this argument, but refused to grant a mistrial. At the close of the punishment phase of trial, the jury sentenced Grant to 30 years of confinement. HOLDING:Affirmed. First, Grant contended that the trial court violated the confrontation clause when it sustained the state’s objections to Grant’s questioning of the responding police officer regarding potentially conflicting witness statements. But the court held that Grant waved any error by failing to object during trial. Second, Grant argued that the trial court violated the confrontation clause when it admitted his high-school disciplinary records. Because the state did not show that the various teachers and school administrators who provided the statements preserved in the disciplinary records were both unavailable to testify and had been cross-examined previously, the court held that the trial court erroneously admitted the testimonial portions of the records. Nonetheless, the court held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. First, the court stated, the testimonial statements were not important to the state’s case. Additionally, the remainder of the disciplinary records, with the exception of the testimonial statements, were admissible. Finally, the prosecution’s case for punishment was very strong even in the absence of the testimonial statements in the school disciplinary records. There was no reasonable possibility, the court stated, that the testimonial statements moved the jury from a state of nonpersuasion to one of persuasion with regard to Grant’s punishment. In his final issue, Grant contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial on the grounds that the state purportedly alluded to Grant’s invocation of his right not to testify. But the court held that the statement at issue did not require a mistrial, because the trial court cured it by granting an immediate instruction to disregard. OPINION:Guzman, J.; Frost, Seymore and Guzman, J.J.

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