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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:When San Antonio police officers entered the home of Maria and Baldomero Herrera, the police found Maria conscious but bleeding near the front door. The Herreras had been shot, and Baldomero lay unconscious in an easy chair. He died at the scene. When officers asked her what had happened, Maria excitedly said that she and her husband had been shot by “a Latin male, blondish colored hair, and he was about 18 years old.” She said “the person that did it is related to the people that live across the street in the rock house.” Maria repeated that he had colored or bleached hair. She stated “that the guy that shot her took her truck” and “she had recognized him from-from the house across the street that had a rock wall in front of it.” Maria said it was “just one person.” Maria died a few hours later. There was only one house with a rock face across the street; appellant’s grandmother lived there. Appellant’s aunt had left him there earlier in the day. His hair was spiky and blonde on top. When the police found the stolen truck at an apartment complex, the appellant led them on a chase that lasted about 15 minutes. After arresting the appellant, the police found a black address book containing Baldomero’s credit cards in the appellant’s pocket. Appellant was taken to jail and his clothes, a white shirt, jeans and tennis shoes, were collected. Maria’s blood was found on the tennis shoes. At the appellant’s capital murder trial, he argued that Maria’s statements were not admissible under the under the excited utterance or dying declaration exceptions. The trial judge doubted that the statements were dying declarations, but he admitted them “mainly under the excited utterance” exception, noting that they also fell under the hearsay exceptions for present-sense impression and then-existing physical condition. The jury convicted appellant of capital murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The court of appeals held that the appellant was precluded from objecting to the introduction of Maria’s statements on confrontation clause grounds because it was his own criminal conduct that rendered Maria unavailable for cross-examination. HOLDING:Affirmed. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that equitable exceptions to the confrontation clause may apply, and it specifically mentioned the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing which “extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds” as one that it accepts. The majority of post-Crawford cases have applied the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine when the trial court makes a preliminary finding under Texas Rule of Evidence 104(a) that the defendant’s act of misconduct caused the witness’s unavailability, although some have also required that the defendant acted with the intent to prevent the witness’s testimony. The court does not settle that dispute in this case. An examination of the entire record clearly supports the inference that appellant shot the Herreras to silence them. The court agrees with those post-Crawford cases and the Crawford amicus brief that the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing may apply even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable. The trial court in this case did not make a preliminary ruling on whether appellant killed Maria, at least in part, to prevent her from testifying against him because this case was tried before Crawford was decided. Nonetheless, an evidentiary ruling, such as the one admitting Maria’s out-of-court statements, will be upheld on appeal if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. The court agrees with the court of appeals that the record provides ample support for the admission of Maria’s out-of-court statements, despite appellant’s confrontation clause objection, because appellant forfeited his right to confront Maria by his own wrongful act. The court expresses no opinion on the court of appeals’ broader holding that the procurement of a witness’s absence need not be motivated by a desire to silence the declarant for the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to apply. OPINION:Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Keller, P.J., Meyers, Price, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, and Holcomb, J.J., joined. Johnson, J., filed a concurring opinion. CONCURRENCE:Johnson, J. “I concur in the judgment of the Court. . . . “I do not think that this is the right case in which to consider expanding the concept of forfeiture by wrongdoing. The basis for such an expansion seems to be based on federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(4), which by its very terms does not apply in this case. In addition, there is a logical disconnect in saying that a defendant killed a person to prevent them from testifying at the defendant’s trial for killing that person; if the defendant did not kill the person, there would be no murder trial and hence no need to suppress damaging testimony, so killing the person creates the reason for killing the person. Such reasoning is circular and should not be incorporated into the law.”

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