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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:During the early morning of May 19, 2002, a Bedford police officer heard loud music playing from appellee’s white Mercedes. The officer believed appellee was violating the Bedford noise ordinance. He pulled appellee over and asked him to turn down his music. While speaking to appellee through the sunroof of the car, Officer Riley smelled alcohol and noticed that appellee’s speech was slurred and his eyes appeared to be bloodshot. The appellee subsequently was arrested for driving while intoxicated. Appellee was charged by a misdemeanor information with driving while intoxicated. He filed a motion to suppress evidence, in which he alleged that he was illegally arrested without a warrant, and thus he requested that all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal arrest be suppressed. Following a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted appellee’s motion. The court ruled that the Bedford noise ordinance is unconstitutional because it is overbroad and vague for its failure to place the public on sufficient notice. The state appealed, and the 2nd Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague because it “describes the prohibited conduct and does not permit arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” Appellee’s motion for rehearing was overruled. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court agrees with the state that the Bedford noise ordinance contains objective criteria for determining what conduct is prohibited and therefore does not permit arbitrary enforcement. The ordinance establishes an objective reasonable-person standard by referring to “neighboring persons of ordinary sensibilities” and banning noise that “unreasonably disturb[s] or interfere[s] with the peace, comfort and repose” of such persons. These words describe noise of the type or volume that a reasonable person would not tolerate under the circumstances. “Because we are limited to the use of words, we cannot demand mathematical certainty from our language.” “Noise” commonly means a loud, confused or senseless outcry; or a sound noticeably loud, harsh or discordant. “Unreasonable” is an objective, reasonable-man standard. The ordinance’s objectivity prevents broad discriminatory or subjective enforcement by the police, the court states. The court holds that the Bedford noise ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague. OPINION:Keller, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Price, Womack, Keasler, Holcomb and Cochran JJ., joined. Hervey, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keasler, J., joined. Meyers, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Johnson, J., concurred in the result. CONCURRENCE:Hervey, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keasler, J., joined. “I agree with the Court that the City of Bedford noise ordinance does not violate the Constitution. I write separately only to suggest that this holding should not be read to foreclose other issues that might have some bearing on whether evidence in cases like this should be excluded or suppressed.”

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