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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Petitioner Theresa Marshall leased an apartment from a nonprofit public facility corporation managed by the Housing Authority of the city of San Antonio for a term beginning Feb. 1, 2002, and ending Jan. 31, 2003. Her rent was subsidized by a federal housing assistance program. Following a shooting at her apartment, the Housing Authority gave Marshall notice that it was terminating her right to occupy the apartment, then filed a forcible detainer action seeking possession of the apartment. On Nov. 1, 2002, the trial court entered judgment awarding the Housing Authority 1. possession of the apartment after Nov. 14, 2002, 2. court costs, and 3. post-judgment interest. On Nov. 8, 2002, Marshall filed a motion seeking suspension of enforcement of the judgment or, in the alternative, setting of a supersedeas bond. In the motion she specified that she intended to appeal. Following a hearing on Nov. 7, 2002, a supersedeas bond amount was set pursuant to Texas Property Code �24.007, but Marshall did not post bond. On Nov. 8, 2002, she filed notice of appeal. The parties agree that a writ of possession was never executed. Marshall does not contest the Housing Authority’s assertion that she vacated the apartment Nov. 14, 2002. The record does not indicate whether the Housing Authority re-let the apartment after Marshall relinquished possession. On April 11, 2003, after her lease term had expired, Marshall filed her brief in the court of appeals praying that the court reverse the trial court’s judgment and award her possession of the apartment. She did not claim in her brief or in her later reply brief any contractual or other right to possession. The court of appeals determined that Marshall’s appeal was moot and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, although it did not vacate the trial court’s judgment. The court of appeals reasoned that because Marshall had relinquished possession of the apartment, the court could no longer grant effectual relief. HOLDING:Vacated and dismissed as moot. The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the premises. Some courts of appeals have held that if a tenant fails to post a supersedeas bond pursuant to Texas Property Code �24.007, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction. Other courts of appeals have concluded that if a tenant vacates the premises, 1. the tenant’s appeal is moot because the court can no longer grant effectual relief, or 2. the issue of possession is moot, but the court can still consider issues unrelated to possession. At least one court of appeals has concluded that a tenant’s appeal is not moot even though the tenant vacated the premises. To the extent holdings in such cases conflict with this opinion, the court disapproves of them. The Texas Property Code provides that judgment in a forcible detainer action may not be stayed pending appeal unless the appellant timely files a supersedeas bond in the amount set by the trial court. Thus, if a proper supersedeas bond is not filed, the judgment may be enforced, including issuance of a writ of possession evicting the tenant from the premises. However, there is no language in the statute which purports to either impair the appellate rights of a tenant or require a bond be posted to perfect an appeal. Marshall’s failure to supersede the judgment did not divest her of her right to appeal. Marshall timely filed a motion seeking suspension of enforcement of the judgment or, in the alternative, setting of a supersedeas bond. Her motion set out her intent to appeal. She timely filed notice of appeal before she vacated her apartment. In light of her timely and clear expression of intent to appeal, Marshall’s action in giving up possession did not moot her appeal so long as appellate relief was not futile; that is, so long as she held and asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the apartment. But, her lease expired Jan. 31, 2003, and she presents no basis for claiming a right to possession after that date. Thus, there was no live controversy between the parties as to the right of current possession after Jan. 31, 2003, and the issue of possession was moot as of that date. Marshall argues that recovery of the fair market value of her lost leasehold interest in this forcible detainer action is authorized by Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code �34.022 and by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 752. Neither of these provisions, however, authorize the type of damages that Marshall seeks. Her property was not sold at execution, and the damages she seeks did not arise until after her county court appeal was complete. Thus, even if her appeal were to be heard and found to have merit, Marshall would not be authorized to recover damages in the forcible detainer suit on the bases she references. Consequently, the damage claims do not present a controversy preventing dismissal of the forcible detainer case as moot, the court determines. In order to invoke the collateral consequences exception, Marshall must show both that a concrete disadvantage resulted from the judgment and that the disadvantage will persist even if the judgment is vacated and the case dismissed as moot. She does not do so. The record contains neither evidence nor an attempt to provide evidence that Marshall’s federal rent subsidy will be denied in the future if the trial court’s judgment is vacated. Marshall specifically identifies only one consequence: Future landlords may be dissuaded from renting an apartment to her. Again, however, the record contains neither evidence nor an attempt to provide evidence supporting her assertion that this practical consequence will persist even if the judgment is vacated. The court declines to hold that the fact a judgment allowing eviction was entered will cause such continuing concrete disadvantages as warrant expansion of the collateral consequences exception, even after the judgment has been vacated for mootness. In some instances a case is not moot even though the only issue presented relates to court costs. If the trial court’s judgment is vacated as a result of the case being moot, however, either there will be no order assessing costs and each party will be required to pay its own costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 127, or the appellate court will tax costs. The court concludes that the Housing Authority’s seeking dismissal of the case because it is otherwise moot and concurrently asserting that the costs awarded by the trial court are de minimus constitute good cause for the Housing Authority to be responsible for its own trial court costs. Also, the issue of the Housing Authority’s costs and post-judgment interest on those costs does not present a controversy preventing dismissal of the case for mootness, the court decides. OPINION:Johnson, J., delivered the court’s opinion. Green, J., did not participate.

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