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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:J.P.B. was born seven weeks premature on April 25, 2002. After the child was released from the hospital on May 21, 2002, Esmeralda B. cared for him at home while Lonnie B. worked at an airplane parts manufacturer. In early July 2002, Lonnie and Esmeralda took J.P.B. to the emergency room on two occasions due to concerns about his constant crying and swollen leg. J.P.B. was admitted to the hospital on July 7, 2002, and released eight days later with a diagnosis of muscle inflammation. At a July 19, 2002, follow-up appointment, J.P.B.’s skeletal X-ray revealed 21 fractures ranging from one to four weeks in age in his ribs, arms and legs. The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services removed J.P.B. from Lonnie B. and Esmeralda B.’s home the following day. TDPRS filed suit to terminate the couple’s parental rights. The jury found by clear and convincing evidence that 1. Lonnie knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.P.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being; 2. termination of Lonnie’s parental rights was in J.P.B.’s best interest; 3. Esmeralda knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.P.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being, and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and 4. termination of Esmeralda’s parental rights was in J.P.B.’s best interest. In conformity with the jury’s verdict, the trial court terminated Lonnie’s and Esmeralda’s parental rights. The court of appeals concluded that no evidence supported the judgment against Lonnie, reversed the judgment and rendered judgment restoring Lonnie’s parental rights. With regard to Esmeralda, the court of appeals concluded that sufficient evidence supported the judgment terminating her parental rights, she was not denied effective assistance of counsel and the X-ray evidence was not improperly admitted. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to Esmeralda. HOLDING:The court reverses the court of appeals’ judgment as to Lonnie and remands to the court of appeals to consider his factual sufficiency complaint. The court first considers whether there was legally sufficient evidence to support the judgment terminating Lonnie’s parental rights. In conducting a legal sufficiency review in a parental termination case, the court considers all of the evidence, not just that which favors the verdict. However, witness credibility issues “that depend on appearance and demeanor cannot be weighed by the appellate court; the witnesses are not present. And even when credibility issues are reflected in the written transcript, the appellate court must defer to the jury’s determinations, at least so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. 2004). The court finds evidence that supports the jury’s finding that Lonnie knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.P.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his physical or emotional well-being. The court also considers undisputed evidence that does not support the jury finding. While it is true that Lonnie sought medical care for J.P.B. multiple times and that J.P.B.’s doctors initially failed to diagnose the fractures, that evidence does not negate the jury’s finding that Lonnie knowingly permitted J.P.B. to remain in a setting that was dangerous to his physical well-being. Lonnie was with J.P.B. and Esmeralda every day of the four-week period during which the fractures likely occurred; J.P.B.’s doctors were not. There was evidence that J.P.B. sustained 21 fractures during a time when he was under Lonnie’s care, and those fractures were likely caused by such abusive treatment as yanking, pulling or punching. The evidence also indicated that the fractures did not occur all at once and were the result of ongoing mistreatment. In light of this evidence, a reasonable jury could infer that, even though Lonnie sought medical treatment for J.P.B., he nevertheless allowed the child to remain in surroundings that endangered his physical well-being. While Lonnie may have reacted appropriately to symptoms of abuse, the evidence supports a finding that he knowingly failed to ameliorate the underlying cause. It was within the jury’s province to judge Lonnie’s demeanor and to disbelieve his testimony that he did not know how J.P.B. was injured. Therefore, the court concludes that there was legally sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that Lonnie knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.P.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered his well-being. Turning to Esmerelda’s no-evidence claims, the court notes that the court of appeals may review the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a parental termination case � even if a party failed to preserve error in the trial court � if the parent’s counsel unjustifiably failed to preserve error. In Re: M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003). The court has not extended this rule to the preservation of “no-evidence” points, and it is not necessary to do so here, the court decides. Esmeralda never alleged in either the court of appeals or in this court that her counsel unjustifiably failed to preserve error; rather, she asserted the no-evidence point without addressing the preservation issue. It is reasonable to presume that her counsel’s decision not to raise a no-evidence point was based either on litigation strategy or on her counsel’s belief that, in his professional opinion, the evidence was legally sufficient and preservation of error was not warranted. The court holds that Esmeralda did not demonstrate that her counsel unjustifiably failed to preserve a no-evidence issue. Esmeralda also argues that she was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel because her trial attorney was appointed less than 30 days prior to trial. Esmeralda failed to demonstrate that her counsel’s performance was deficient. Esmeralda argues that the trial court erred in admitting TDPRS’s X-ray evidence without proper authentication because the X-rays were printed from a computer program that allowed alteration of the image. The court agrees with the court of appeals that the trial court did not err in admitting this evidence. OPINION:Per curiam.

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