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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:When J.H. was 15 years of age, the trial court adjudicated J.H. a child engaged in delinquent conduct for committing aggravated sexual assault of a child. The trial court committed J.H. to the Texas Youth Commission for 10 years, probated for 10 years, and placed him in his mother’s custody. Approximately two years later, the trial court granted the state’s motion to transfer determinate sentence probation to a criminal court and ordered J.H.’s probation transferred to the 283rd Judicial District Court, effective J.H.’s 18th birthday, one month away. J.H. appealed the trial court’s order transferring determinate sentence probation. J.H. argued on appeal that the trial court erred in transferring his probation because: 1. the state’s motion did not cite adequate grounds to give the trial court discretion to transfer J.H.’s probation; 2. the trial court erred in signing a nunc pro tunc order without notice or hearing; 3. the trial court erred by not filing additional findings of fact and conclusions of law after a timely request to do so; and 4. �56.01 of the Texas Family Code is unconstitutional. HOLDING:Dismissed. The court concludes the trial court’s order is not appealable and J.H.’s argument that �56.01 is unconstitutional is without merit. The court states that �56.01 of the Texas Family Code sets out a child’s right to appeal a juvenile court’s orders and describes which of those orders are appealable. The court then points out that an order entered under �54.051 to transfer a determinate sentence probation to an appropriate district court is not one of the orders enumerated in the statute. Therefore, applying the plain language of �54.051(c), the court concludes that the trial court’s order transferring determinate sentence probation to an appropriate criminal district court is not an appealable order. J.H. then contends that �56.01 allows some juveniles to appeal while denying other juveniles the same appeal rights and, therefore, discriminates against certain juveniles simply because of the type of hearing held by a juvenile court. But the court points out that the Texas and U.S. Constitutions do not provide for a right of appeal. Thus, the court explains, when a legislative enactment says a juvenile may appeal orders delineated in the statute, there is no right to appeal orders not so included. Further, the court concludes that because J.H. is treated the same as all similarly situated juveniles whose determinate sentence probation is transferred to a criminal district court, his argument fails and the court dismisses his appeal for want of jurisdiction. OPINION:Morris, J.; Morris, Bridges, and Francis, JJ.

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