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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:At the time of K.N.P.’s birth, her biological mother, Anne P., was married to Curtis P., K.N.P.’s presumed father. Anne and Curtis knew when Anne became pregnant with K.N.P. that she was probably not Curtis’s child because Curtis had undergone a vasectomy. Anne and Curtis initially planned to divorce but reconciled shortly after K.N.P. was born. When Anne and Curtis learned she was pregnant, they told William, K.N.P.’s alleged biological father. According to Anne, William acknowledged his probable paternity and paid her $600 per month for about 10 months while she was pregnant and for a short time after K.N.P. was born. William did not pay for any prenatal care or childbirth expenses, other than to perform an initial pregnancy test in his office. William stopped paying the $600 when Anne and Curtis reconciled. Anne and Curtis raised K.N.P. as their daughter and gave her their last name. When K.N.P. was nearly 12 years old, Anne and Curtis filed suit against William seeking to adjudicate William as K.N.P.’s biological father and seeking future and retroactive child support and reimbursement of prenatal and childbirth expenses. They also sought to be named joint managing conservators of K.N.P. K.N.P. was unaware that Curtis was not her father until after Anne and Curtis learned the results of genetic testing as part of their suit. William filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the suit was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Texas Family Code �160.607(a). The trial court granted his motion. Anne and Curtis appealed the summary judgment on the ground that �160.607(a), which provides that a suit to adjudicate paternity of a child with a presumed father must be brought within four years of the date of the child’s birth, is an impermissible retroactive law. They also argued that their suit was timely because it was filed within four years after the effective date of �160.607(a). HOLDING:Affirmed. The court states that �160.607(a), which became effective June 14, 2001, requires a suit to establish parentage on behalf of a child with a presumed father be brought no later than the child’s fourth birthday. The court then points out that the statutes in effect from the time that K.N.P. was born in 1992 until June 14, 2001 allowed a mother, a presumed father or both to bring a suit disputing the presumed father’s paternity and attempting to adjudicate an alleged biological father’s paternity until the second anniversary of the day the child became an adult, generally age 20. Thus, the court notes, until �160.607(a) became effective, Anne and Curtis had the expectation that they could bring their claims at any time until K.N.P.’s 20th birthday. The court therefore holds that the statute did not provide a reasonable time for appellants to bring suit after enactment of the new law and therefore violated Article I, �16 of the Texas Constitution. Having determined that �160.607(a) did not provide a reasonable time for appellants to bring suit after its enactment, the court then considers whether appellants’ suit was filed within a reasonable time after the effective date of �160.607(a). The court finds that appellants had approximately 10 years and nine months � approximately 54 percent of the former limitations period � remaining to file suit under the former law. The court then determines that a reasonable, proportionate time for them to file suit under �160.607(a) would be 54 percent of four years, approximately two years and two months after the effective date of the statute, or until mid-August 2003. Adding that to the time elapsed under the prior law, the court finds that appellants had approximately 11 years and five months after K.N.P.’s birth to file a suit seeking to deny Curtis’ paternity and establish William’s. Appellants did not file suit until nearly 12 years later; thus, the court holds that they did not file their suit within a reasonable time after the enactment of �160.607(a). Consequently, the court holds that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to William. OPINION:Livingston, J.; Livingston, Dauphinot, and McCoy, JJ.

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