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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Rebecca Jernigan filed a motion to enforce the child support provisions of her 1990 divorce decree, which dissolved her marriage with Eddie Duane Cunningham. The court rendered judgment for $8,768 in arrearages, found Cunningham in contempt of court for failing to pay these sums and ordered him confined for 180 days for each violation. The court suspended commitment on condition that Cunningham pay these arrearages at $150 per month. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. Jernigan signed the judgment indicating her approval “as to form and content” and because her counsel signed the judgment indicating his approval “as to form.” the judgment makes no reference to an agreement of the parties regarding the terms of the judgment. “Under these circumstances, we agree with the observations of the San Antonio Court in Lohse v. Cheatham, 705 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1986, writ dism’d). ‘Nowhere in the decree does it recite that the Court is making any disposition according to an agreement of the parties. The document contains the signatures of the parties and their attorneys evidencing their approval of the document as reflecting the trial court’s actions.’ ” The court concludes that the judgment in this case is not an agreed judgment. A trial court has discretion in setting the monthly payment for confirmed arrearages and in extending the payout term for “a reasonable length of time” on a finding “that the schedule for discharging arrearages would cause the obligor, the obligor’s family, or children for whom support is due from the obligor to suffer unreasonable hardship.” Texas Family Code 158.007. Here, the parties do not dispute the amount of the arrearages. The court’s review is limited to the issue of whether the court abused its discretion by permitting Cunningham to pay off the arrearages over a period which will exceed two years. Testimony suggests that his present financial circumstances permit him to pay $100 per week but he is concerned about the consequences of future financial difficulties. This is not an adequate factual basis to support a finding that requiring Cunningham to pay the arrearages off in two years will result in an unreasonable hardship. Because the record does not provide an adequate factual basis to support the court’s implied finding of unreasonable hardship, the court concludes that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Cunningham to pay off his arrearages over a period of more than two years. OPINION:Reyna, J.; before Gray, Vance and Reyna, JJ. DISSENT:Gray, C.J. “I dissent. I refuse to find that a trial court errs when it signs a judgment expressly”agreed as to form and content’ by the appellant individually and agreed as to form by the attorney for the appellant, the only party represented by an attorney.”

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