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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Applicant is currently serving a nine-year sentence for the third degree felony offense of burglary of a vehicle, an offense that he committed on Oct. 30, 1992. In 1997, while on parole for this burglary offense, applicant pleaded guilty to the second degree felony offense of indecency with a child by contact, a crime which he had committed on June 7, 1993, some four years earlier. He was sentenced to two years imprisonment on this later offense and had credit for time served beginning on Oct. 31, 1994. Thus, applicant had fully discharged the indecency sentence by Oct. 30, 1996, even though he was not actually convicted of that offense until 1997. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, applicant complains that he should have received street-time credit, under Texas Government Code 508.283, for all time spent on parole or mandatory release. The trial court concluded that “[a]pplicant is described in Section 508.149(a) of the Government Code, due to his prior conviction for the offense of indecency with a child by contact. Therefore, applicant is not entitled to credit for the time he spent on parole under Section 501.0081 of the Government Code.” HOLDING:“TDCJ shall treat applicant as an inmate eligible for release to mandatory supervision and, because applicant qualifies for street-time credit, shall credit him with his out-of-custody time during his latest release.” Section 508.283 would grant applicant “street time” credit if, at the time the parole revocation warrant issued, he had spent more time on release than he had left to serve and he is not a person “described by 508.149(a).” Because applicant spent more time on mandatory supervision (two years and 12 days) than he had left to serve (less than a year), the court addresses whether he is a person described by 508.149(a): Is he an inmate ineligible for mandatory supervision. Eligibility for mandatory supervision is governed by the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. When applicant committed his holding offense, the 1992 burglary of a vehicle, he was eligible for release to mandatory supervision. Once eligible he remains eligible regardless of whether the applicable mandatory supervision law has changed in the meantime. This is why he was released on mandatory supervision in 2001 even though he had, by then, been convicted of indecency with a child, an offense for which he would be ineligible for release on mandatory supervision. Because the laws applying to applicant in 1992, when he committed the burglary of a vehicle offense, permitted his release to mandatory supervision, he is not a person described by 508.149(a). Furthermore, the indecency-with-a-child conviction is not a previous conviction which could affect applicant’s eligibility for release on mandatory supervision for the earlier burglary offense, it is a later or subsequent conviction. The court finds that the plain meaning of the term “previously convicted” in 508.149(a) is the same when it is used to describe those who are ineligible for release on mandatory supervision as when it is used to describe those who are ineligible for street-time credit under 508.283(c). The applicant is not serving a sentence for indecency with a child. Applicant’s holding conviction for burglary occurred before his conviction for indecency with a child. Therefore, applicant’s indecency conviction cannot be called a “previous” conviction under 508.149(a) and make him ineligible for street-time credit on the burglary conviction. OPINION:Cochran, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Price, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey and Holcomb, JJ., joined. Meyers and Womack, JJ., not participating. Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. DISSENT:Keller, P.J. “In 2001, the Legislature added to Government Code 508.283 a provision that awards street time credit to certain offenders upon revocation of parole or mandatory supervision. This time credit does not apply to”a person described by Section 508.149(a).’ The Court’s opinion equates the phrase”a person described by Section 508.149(a)’ with”a person to whom Section 508.149(a) applies’ and it construes”previously convicted’ to mean”convicted before the holding offense.’ I respectfully disagree with both of these propositions.”

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