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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant, Digital Imaging Associates Inc., brings a restricted appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30, complaining that the trial court improperly granted the state’s motion for nonsuit and dismissed all parties without prejudice. Digital contends that it had a pending claim for affirmative relief, which should not have been dismissed. On May 23, 2003, the state filed a notice of seizure and intended forfeiture against “two Computers and Miscellaneous Equipment Listed on Attachment”A.’ ” On July 7, 2003, Digital filed a petition in intervention. On Aug. 12, 2003, the state filed its motion for nonsuit, which the trial court granted on Aug. 13, 2003. HOLDING:Affirmed. Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162, a plaintiff has an absolute right to take a nonsuit upon timely motion, as long as the defendant has not made a claim for affirmative relief. Greenberg v. Brookshire, 640 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982). Digital’s intervention petition claims that the seizure of such property and equipment was wrongful, and that the requested forfeiture is improper and should be denied. Digital’s first amended petition in intervention, in which it seeks “a declaration from the Court that its manufacture and sale of identification cards is legal and does not violate the laws of the State of Texas,” merely mirrors the controlling issues in the state’s case. Therefore, Digital’s claim for a declaratory judgment is not a claim for affirmative relief. Digital’s pleadings do not contain any facts upon which affirmative relief could be granted � they merely deny the lawfulness of the state’s cause of action. Because Digital’s pleadings do not state a claim for affirmative relief, the trial court did not err by granting the state’s nonsuit. Digital argues that the nonsuit order is not a final judgment because it does not name Digital, nor does it specifically dispose of Digital’s petition in intervention. However, the order expressly states that it disposes of all parties and Digital was a party to the suit by way of its intervention. Furthermore, Digital’s petition in intervention did not state an affirmative claim for relief. As such, the nonsuit order, which disposed of the state’s claims � the only claims for affirmative relief � actually disposed of all pending claims for relief in the suit. Because the nonsuit order “actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court,” as required by Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), it is final. OPINION:Radack, C.J.; Radack, C.J., Jennings and Hanks, JJ.

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