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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The San Antonio Court of Appeals lays out the facts as follows: Harold Shields was indicted for aggravated sexual assault, but the victim recanted and the state dismissed the indictment. Shields, represented by attorneys Frank Ford and Tom Newton, filed a federal suit against the county, the prosecutor and the investigator, alleging that their failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury violated Shields’ civil rights and constituted malicious prosecution. The federal district judge quashed subpoenas issued by Ford and Newton to the grand jurors in their investigation of Shields’ claim and granted a protective order requested by the state. Ford and Newton’s petition to the state district court under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 20.02(d) to order disclosure of the information presented to the grand jury was denied. Ford and Newton subsequently were indicted for “knowingly and with the intent to obtain a benefit, solicit[ing] or receiv[ing] from a public servant, to wit: grand juror [name], information that said public servant had access to by means of his/her office, and that said information had not been made public.” Each attorney was separately indicted for allegedly contacting five different grand jurors. Ford and Newton filed a joint motion to quash the indictments, which the trial court granted. The trial court dismissed the indictments based on three grounds: failure to allege an offense as a matter of law because grand jury information does not meet the definition of “information that has not been made public” under Texas Penal Code 39.06(d); inadequate notice of the type of information solicited or received; and inadequate notice of the benefit to be obtained from the information. The trial court also held that subsections (c) and (d) of 39.06 are unconstitutionally void for vagueness. The state perfected its appeal. The five appeals relating to Ford were consolidated with each other, and the five appeals relating to Newton also were consolidated. HOLDING:Affirmed. The state asserts that the indictments tracked the statute and thus sufficiently alleged an offense under 39.06(c), that the indictments adequately notified the defendants of the nature of the charges against them, and that subsections (c) and (d) of 39.06 are not unconstitutionally void for vagueness. Because the court affirms the trial court’s judgment on the basis that the indictments failed to allege an offense as a matter of law, it addresses only that issue on appeal. The trial court quashed the indictments in part because they failed to allege an offense as a matter of law, finding that information presented to the grand jury was not information prohibited from disclosure under Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code, as required by the definition of the offense in 39.06(d). Chapter 552 of the Government Code is commonly known as the Open Records Act. The parties do not dispute, and the court agrees, that information presented to a grand jury clearly constitutes “information to which the public does not generally have access,” and thus meets the first part of 39.06(d)’s definition of nonpublic information. With respect to the second component of 39.06(d)’s definition, that the subject information be prohibited from disclosure under Chapter 552, however, the court looks to the Open Records Act to determine whether it prohibits disclosure of grand jury information. The Open Records Act provides a set of exceptions to required disclosure for certain categories of public information. The court finds that the terminology used in the penal statute does not match the terminology of the Open Records Act. However, the court states that it is required to construe the two statutes so that they work together in order to bring about the Legislature’s intent. Ford and Newton argue, and the trial court agreed, that because grand juries are considered part of the judiciary, information presented to a grand jury is exempt from the Open Records Act and its disclosure is neither permitted nor prohibited under the act. The court concurs, and holds that, based on its nature and functions, the grand jury is an extension of the judiciary. The court points out that the Open Records Act clearly and unequivocally excludes judicial information from its scope. Because the Open Records Act is simply not applicable to information presented to a grand jury, the court holds that the information that Ford and Newton allegedly solicited or received from the grand jurors did not fall within the act’s scope, and thus could not be prohibited from disclosure under Chapter 552, as required by 39.06(d). Accordingly, the indictments did not allege facts that, if true, would constitute an offense under 39.06(c). OPINION:Speedlin, J.; Alma L. L�pez, C.J., Karen Angelini and Phylis J. Speedlin, JJ.

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