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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A Smith County jury found appellant guilty of capital murder under Texas Penal Code 19.03(a)(2). Appellant’s punishment was assessed at death. HOLDING:The court affirms the judgment of the trial court as it relates to the appellant’s conviction, reverses the judgment of the trial court as it relates to appellant’s punishment, and remands the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The appellant argues that the record evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for capital murder. The court holds that a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed murder in the course of burglary. The appellant contends that the evidence of intent to commit robbery or burglary was factually insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. The court finds ample evidence showing that appellant was in the midst of a drug binge on the day of the murder, that he was in search of crack cocaine, and that he was willing to rent out the victim’s car in order to get more drugs. The appellant’s fingerprints, a palm print, and some of his hair were found next to the victim’s body. The appellant was found driving the victim’s car and the title documents were found in appellant’s pocket. In light of the overwhelmingly inculpatory evidence, the contrary evidence is not so strong that the standard of proof could not have been met, the court holds. The appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence at the punishment phase of the trial. The appellant claims the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the special issue concerning his future dangerousness. The state introduced evidence that the appellant had several prior felony and misdemeanor convictions. A psychologist and two psychiatrists testified that the appellant exhibited characteristics of anti-social personality disorder and that he would likely commit criminal acts of violence in the future. One of the psychiatrists also testified, without objection, about the appellant’s numerous disciplinary offenses while incarcerated in the Smith County Jail and in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. “All of this evidence, when combined with the evidence of the horrific offense of which appellant was convicted in this case, was clearly sufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue.” The appellant contends that the trial court erroneously granted the state’s challenge of a prospective juror for cause. The record reflects that the prospective juror vacillated about her position on the death penalty and gave conflicting answers about her ability to follow the law. The court defers to the trial court, as it was in a better position to evaluate her ability to serve on the jury. The trial court erred in admitting portions of jail incident and disciplinary reports that contained testimonial statements. Given the highly damaging nature of the reports and the fact that the prosecutor repeatedly emphasized them during his closing argument, the court finds it impossible to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the reports did not influence the jury in its assessment of appellant’s future dangerousness. The appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting fingerprint-comparison evidence. The court concludes that fingerprint-comparison testimony is admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because it is reliable and it assists the trier of fact in its task of determining whether a latent fingerprint is that of a particular person. The court overrules the appellant’s other assertions of error. OPINION:Holcomb, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Price, Womack, Johnson, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Keasler, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Keller, P.J., and Meyers and Hervey, JJ., dissented without written opinion. DISSENT:Keasler, J. “The exhibits at issue in these points of error are business records. The Supreme Court specified in Crawford v. Washington that business records are not testimonial hearsay. Many other courts have acknowledged this. As a result, Ohio v. Roberts controls. And because these exhibits fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, they do not violate the Confrontation Clause.”

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