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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The applicant in this habeas corpus case was serving an eight-year sentence for a mandatory supervision eligible offense in cause number 0243176D, with a calculated begin date of April 30, 1984, when he was sentenced to 15 years in cause number 8565 for an offense that was not mandatory supervision eligible. This 15-year sentence was ordered to begin when the eight-year sentence in cause number 0243176D ceased to operate. The applicant contends that the eight-year sentence in cause number 0243176D ceased to operate on Dec. 18, 1990, when he would have been automatically released to mandatory supervision had he not committed the offense in cause number 8565. HOLDING:Denied. The applicant’s claimed projected maximum release date of Dec. 18, hinges on the claim that his eight-year sentence in cause number 0243176D ceased to operate on Dec. 18, 1990, when he would have been automatically released on mandatory supervision on this sentence had he not committed the offense in cause number 8565. This court in Ex Parte Ruthart, 980 S.W.2d 469 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998), rejected the claim that mandatory supervision is an event that causes an inmate’s first sentence to cease to operate. This rested in large part on Ruthart’s definition of “maximum term” in former Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 42.18 8(c) .most of which was reenacted in Texas Government Code 508.147(a). “If”term’ for 508.147(a) purposes applied to the first sentence in a series of sentences, it would be possible for an inmate to”spend twenty or thirty years on [mandatory supervision], living and working in the community, a rehabilitated and contributing member of society. When at last his [mandatory supervision] is complete and his sentence discharges, he must then be returned to prison to begin serving his second sentence.’ [Ex parte Kuester, 21 S.W.3d 264 (Tex.Cr.App. 2000)]. We decline to adopt this construction and we adhere to our prior decisions that a sentence ceases to operate when it is served out in full day-for-day or on the date a parole panel designates as the date an inmate would have been eligible for release on parole if the inmate had been sentenced to serve a single sentence.” OPINION:Hervey, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. CONCURRENCE:Johnson, J., filed a concurring opinion. “The current statute makes mandatory supervision a fraternal twin of parole; it is parole in everything but name and eligibility rules and both multiplies and complicates the work of the parole panels. Given that reality, the issue of whether discretionary mandatory supervision belongs among the events that triggers the commencement of a consecutive sentence, or should even continue to exist, is ripe for re-examination.”

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