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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:John Holloway is an attorney who specializes in medical-malpractice cases. Douglas Wohlfahrt is a doctor. From 1983 to 1992, Holloway handled various legal matters for Wohlfahrt and his wife. Also during this period Wohlfahrt reviewed medical files for Holloway’s cases. According to Wohlfahrt, he had a bartering arrangement with Holloway. Holloway, however said that Wohlfahrt owed him for his legal services. In fact, Holloway did bill Wohlfahrt for some services for which Wohlfahrt paid, but Holloway did not bill for other legal services over the years. Holloway sued Wohlfahrt to recover fees for services. In return, Wohlfahrt filed a counterclaim under the DTPA. The first trial of the case ended with the trial court ruling Wohlfahrt’s DTPA claims were barred, but the 1st Court of Appeals in Houston reversed in an unpublished opinion. In the second trial, the jury had 32 separate questions to answers, each with numerous sub-questions. The jury primarily found that: 1. there was no bartering agreement; 2. there was no attorney-client agreement; 3. Holloway loaned money to Wohlfahrt, and Wohlfahrt paid some of it back; 4. Holloway knowingly engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that caused Wohlfahrt damages; and 5. Holloway knowingly engaged in an unconscionable action or course of action that caused damages to Wohlfahrt. Post-verdict, the trial court ruled that: 1. Holloway was entitled to judgment on his a quantum meruit claim for the services he provided to Wohlfahrt; 2. Holloway was entitled to judgment on his debt claims; and 3. Wohlfahrt’s counterclaims, including the DTPA claims, were time-barred. HOLDING:Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part; dismissed in part. On appeal, Wohlfahrt argues that the quantum meruit claim was not properly put before the jury. Holloway responds that the quantum meruit claim was contained with one of the jury questions asking about the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees Holloway was entitled to for the legal services he provided Wohlfahrt. The court says there are three reasons the question should not be read as presenting a quantum meruit claim. First, it does not include any of the required elements for such a claim. Second, the question’s placement in the charge suggests that it is part of a breach-of-contract submission and should not be read separately. Third, at trial, Holloway, who was appearing pro se, denied that he was seeking recovery under a quantum meruit theory. The court acknowledges that Holloway would still be entitled to a quantum meruit judgment if he conclusively proved the claim. He did not, however, the court concludes. Holloway’s services occurred over a nine-year period. He did not submit a bill for services or demand payment until after the parties had a falling out and suit was filed. This is evidence that Holloway did not expect to be paid at the time services were rendered. At a minimum, the court rules, it suggests that Wohlfahrt could have reasonably believed that Holloway did not expect to be paid. The court then examines whether Wohlfahrt’s DTPA claims are time-barred. The court confirms that the 1st Court of Appeals ruling that Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code �16.069 does not bar the counterclaim still stands. Holloway did not request or get a jury finding on the accrual of Wohlfahrt’s cause of action or the running of the statute of limitations; he also made no argument in the trial court or in his appellate brief that he had established either issue as a matter of law. Thus, Wohlfahrt was never required to request an issue or present evidence regarding the discovery rule; the burden of production never shifted to him because Holloway never met his initial burden. Consequently, the trial court was wrong to grant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the DTPA counterclaims being barred. The court upholds the amount of post-verdict interest the trial court applied to the debt Wohlfahrt owed, noting that Wohlfahrt did not object to the means to calculate the interest at trial. The court dismisses Holloway’s appeal concerning the taxation of costs in the earlier appeal to the 1st Court of Appeals. The court admits that this area of the law is murky, but notwithstanding that fact, the 1st COA proceedings were part and parcel of the first appeal and played no role in the second trial or in the second appeal brought by Wohlfahrt. OPINION:Adele Hedges, C.J.; Hedges, C.J., Fowler and Edelman, JJ.

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