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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Upon the close of evidence at her resisting arrest trial, Lydia Bowen sought a jury instruction on the defense of necessity. The trial judge refused this request. Affirming the trial judge’s refusal, the Court of Appeals held that the self-defense statute, Penal Code 9.31, demonstrated a legislative purpose to exclude the necessity defense under 9.22(3). HOLDING:The trial court erred in refusing Bowen’s requested necessity instruction. The court reverses and remands this case to the court of appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Section 9.22′s plain language indicates that the defense of necessity may be applicable in every case unless specifically excluded by the legislature. To determine whether a legislative purpose exists to exclude the defense, the court focuses on the statute defining the charged offense. Texas Penal Code 38.03 does not limit the necessity defense’s application, because a legislative purpose to exclude the defense does not plainly appear in its text. The court cannot glean any clear legislative purpose indicating that the necessity defense is not available. The state’s argument that the necessity defense’s availability must be viewed in light of 9.31 also fails because, the court states, it ignores that necessity and self-defense are separate defenses. The state attempts to link the two defense statutes together by Bowen’s use of force. However, Bowen’s conduct does not merge the two defense provisions into a single, unified defense. While Bowen’s use of force may limit her ability to invoke self-defense, it does not exclude a necessity defense to a resisting arrest offense as a matter of law. We have recognized the independence of separate defenses by holding that a defendant is entitled to the submission of every defensive issue raised by the evidence, even if the defense may be inconsistent with other defenses. The court reaffirms this principle by holding self-defense’s statutorily imposed restrictions do not foreclose necessity’s availability. The court of appeals and the state seize upon the issue of whether Bowen knew she was being placed under arrest as a dispositive factor in assessing necessity’s availability. But this reasoning assumes that the necessity defense is controlled by the self-defense statute’s provisions addressing the use of force. Because the court holds otherwise, Bowen’s knowledge that she was being placed under arrest is irrelevant to determine whether she was entitled to a necessity instruction as a matter of law, the court concludes. OPINION:Keasler, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Meyers, Price, Womack, Johnson, Hervey,and Holcomb, JJ., joined. Keller, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion. Cochran, J., filed a dissenting opinion. DISSENT:Keller, P.J. “By its nature, the “necessity” defense is a catch-all provision designed to afford a defense in situations where a defense is clearly warranted but is not afforded by any other statutory provision. I would hold that a necessity defense is not raised if the evidence presented merely raises an issue under another statutory defense. Otherwise, entitlement to an instruction for certain defenses such as self-defense and defense of a third person would always also entail entitlement to an instruction on the defense of necessity. Submitting wholly redundant defenses would not aid the truth-finding function of the trial and risks confusing the jury.” DISSENT:Cochran, J. “I agree with the majority that the statutory defenses of self-defense under Texas Penal Code, section 9.31, and necessity under section 9.22 are not mutually exclusive in the context of a resisting arrest prosecution. However, I do not think that the court of appeals said that they were. Rather, both the trial court and the court of appeals stated that given the specific evidence in this particular case, appellant’s defense was wholly encompassed by the trial court’s instructions on self-defense. I agree with that conclusion and therefore respectfully disagree with the majority’s holding.”

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