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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Four-year-old C’s grandmother woke up one night to find C on all fours on the bed calling out for D to stop hurting him and get off of him. The next morning, the grandmother asked C why he was yelling, and C said that D, his 15-year-old cousin, had “put his thing up my ass.” The grandmother talked to two of D’s other cousins to see if they knew anything, and both of the cousins said C had “got” them, too. The grandmother reported the information to the sheriff’s office. Detective Tim Bryan notified Child Protective Services and set up interviews for the alleged victims at the Child Advocacy Center. Each child restated his allegations against D. At least one of the children also said that D had sexually assaulted a fourth cousin, as well as a neighbor. All were under the age of 14. The neighbor said that D had tied him to a chair in the local clubhouse and ordered him to perform oral sex. The neighbor said that D had a knife and D told him that if he didn’t do as he said, D would cut him. Three of the victims reported that D’s sister J had also participated in some of the assaults. J was detained but was then released when the children admitted to making up the story. During D’s trial, Bryan testified about his interview of the grandmother and the subsequent investigation. When asked if he knew the children had recanted their allegations against J, Bryan initially said that he did not. On cross-examination, though confirming he did not know about the children’s’ recantation, Bryan nonetheless admitted he knew who J was and that she had taken a polygraph test. The trial court instructed the jury to ignore Bryan’s reference to a polygraph test. D was eventually convicted by a jury of committing six acts of aggravated sexual assault against five different victims and that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon during one of the incidents. He was placed in the managing conservatorship of the Department of Protective and Regulatory Services, who placed D at a juvenile sex offender treatment facility. He was also required to register as a sex offender. D appeals. D argues that the statute requiring him to register as a sex offender amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. He also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the six counts. D challenges the trial court’s decision not to grant a mistrial over Bryan’s mention of J’s polygraph results, and he contests the deadly weapon finding. HOLDING:Affirmed. Though confirming that it has never ruled on whether the sex offender registry statute is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, the court also notes that the legislature clearly intended juveniles to be included within the statute’s provisions. To succeed in his challenge to the statute, then, D would have to show that the statute always constitutes cruel and unusual punishment when applied to all juveniles, not just him. To analyze the issue, the court considers whether the statute is punitive. The legislative history indicates that the statute was not intended to be punitive. While the statute may have the secondary consequence of shaming a juvenile, that is a community response. The statute itself does not impose shame and so is not punitive. Therefore, it is not cruel and unusual punishment. Turning to the question of the decision not to sever the six charges into six separate trials, the court observes that the Juvenile Justice Code addresses joinder of claims, but not severance. The court thus applies Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 41, noting that the rule allows actions involving common questions of law or fact to be consolidated. Here, the legal elements of proof were similar for each count; the cases shared common witnesses; and there were similar sexual assault fact patterns. Furthermore, D did not make a showing that evidence of the other offenses would not have been admissible in the severed cases. The court agrees there was error in allowing the jury to hear Bryan say J took a polygraph, and his inference that she passed it. The court finds the error harmless, though, in part because his reference to the polygraph test was responsive to a question asked by D’s attorney. Additionally, because J was not called as a witness, the inference that she passed the polygraph test could not bolster her credibility as a witness. Though the credibility of the child whose original testimony was recanted was at issue, reference to J’s polygraph results would ultimately bolster the defense’s theory that the allegations against him were fabricated. The court rules the deadly weapon finding was properly entered. That the state did not introduce evidence about the size, shape or sharpness of the knife did not matter, as there was evidence that D used a knife to coerce one of the children into the sexual assault. Finally, the court finds that the trial court’s reliance on the probation department to prepare an order reflecting what it referred to as the “standard” conditions of probation, in addition to the conditions announced in open court, did not constitute an improper delegation of authority. OPINION: Worthen, C.J.; Worthen, C.J., Griffith and DeVasto, JJ.

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