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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Greer executed a royalty deed to Steger Energy Corp. Steger sold its interest to J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. for $360,000, Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., successor to the working interest in Tract 3 that Greer conveyed to J. Charles Holliman Inc., pooled about 313 acres, including Tracts 1-4, at a different horizon than the SixS Frels Gas Unit, for production from the Greer #1 Well, which had been completed in Tract 3. Moore claimed all royalties with respect to the interests partitioned to Greer in Tracts 1-4, and when Greer disputed the claim, Kaiser-Francis suspended payments for those tracts. Moore sued Greer to determine their respective rights, and Greer counterclaimed for declaratory relief as well as rescission and reformation based on mutual mistake and fraud. Moore moved for summary judgment, contending that it had acquired all of Greer’s royalty interests in Wharton County by purchasing her royalty deed to Steger. Greer responded that she had intended to convey to Steger only her interests in the SixS Frels Unit in the Barnard Survey. In her supporting affidavit, she stated: “I did not intend to convey any other property. I specifically did not intend to convey any of my interest in the I&GNRR Co. Survey No. 6, Abstract 232 Wharton County, Texas.” The trial court granted Moore’s motion for summary judgment and severed Greer’s claims for rescission and reformation. Those claims remain pending. The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment This court granted a petition for review to determine the extent of the interest conveyed in a deed. HOLDING:Affirmed and remanded to the trial court. The specific description in Greer’s deed points to a survey in which Greer apparently owns no interest. The deed purports to convey “[a]ll of that tract of land out of the AB 801 SEC 14/W M BARNARD #14 SURVEY, . . . known as the MEDALLION OIL-SIXS FRELS UNIT.” As previously noted, Greer owns a 1/4 nonparticipating royalty interest in Tracts 1 and 2, which were pooled in the SixS Frels Unit; however, neither tract is in the W M Barnard Survey. Therefore, the specific description either does not describe any royalty interests owned by Greer, or it incorrectly describes her royalty interests in Tracts 1 and 2 that are part of the SixS Frels Unit by stating that they are in the W M Barnard Survey instead of the I. & G. N. R.R. Survey. The general description conveys “all of grantors [sic] royalty and overriding royalty interest in all oil, gas and other minerals in the above named county or counties, whether actually or properly described herein or not, and all of said lands are covered and included herein as fully, in all respects, as if the same had been actually and properly described herein.” The deed in effect states that Greer conveys nothing, and that she conveys everything. The court decides it cannot construe this deed as a matter of law. Given the deed’s ambiguity, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, the court concludes. A jury should hear evidence and determine the parties’ intent. OPINION:Jefferson, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court; Hecht, O’Neill, Smith, Wainwright and Brister, JJ., joined. CONCURRENCE:Hecht, J.; “The dissent poses five situations in which, I agree, a general grant should be construed according to its terms, but it is just as easy to pose other circumstances in which it will seem highly unlikely that the parties fully intended what they actually said, and unjust to hold one of them to it. We should not use this case to make bad law. As long as a rule that gives effect to general grants with a few exceptions seems to manage the cases that arise, I would not change it simply because it could, possibly, prove unworkable.” (footnote omitted) DISSENT:Owen, J.; Medina, J., joins. “What principle of law does the Court announce today that will give stability and predictability in construing deeds, wills, oil and gas leases, liens, and deeds of trust? I can discern none. We are told only that when there is at least one specific grant and it fails, an unambiguous general grant is rendered ambiguous. Accordingly, there will be trials, sometimes years after the grantors and grantees have passed on, to determine what a conveyance meant.”

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