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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant was convicted of a felony driving-while-intoxicated offense. He challenges the legality of his warrantless home arrest. The evidence presented at the suppression hearing shows that the police had probable cause to believe that appellant was intoxicated when, in the middle of the afternoon, appellant wrecked his truck, abandoned it, and � “bleeding from the mouth” � walked home, which was a short distance away. Very soon thereafter, a police officer went to appellant’s home to investigate. This officer testified that, while outside, he saw appellant with blood around his mouth standing behind a full-length glass storm door and that appellant eventually motioned for the officer to come inside. The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress without specifying its reasons for doing so. On direct appeal, appellant claimed that his warrantless home arrest was “tainted” because the police entry into his home was illegal under state law. The court of appeals rejected this claim. HOLDING:Affirmed. Under the facts of this case, appellant’s home � where police arrested him for DWI shortly after he abandoned his wrecked truck at the scene of the accident and walked home � was a “suspicious place” under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.03(a)(1) and under this court’s reasoning in Dyar v. State, 125 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Cr. App. 2003). Article 14.03(a)(1) and Article 14.05(a)(1) offer more shelter than the heightened protections that the Fourth Amendment provides against physical entry into a person’s home. Article 14.03(a)(1) requires that circumstances exist showing that persons in circumstances similar to appellant have been guilty of some breach of the peace. Article 14.05(a)(1) requires that someone who lives in the home at issue consent to the police entry. Thus, deciding, under these circumstances, that a home can meet the “suspicious place” requirement of Article 14.03(a)(1) is not inconsistent with these heightened privacy protections under state and federal constitutional law. In other words, the circumstances surrounding appellant’s warrantless home arrest raised a reasonable belief that appellant had committed a breach of the peace and that exigent circumstances (the need to ascertain appellant’s blood-alcohol level) existed to justify appellant’s immediate arrest. The court notes that the decision in this case does not give the police carte blanche authority to unilaterally make warrantless home arrests. The state statutes strike a proper balance between the competing interests of privacy and legitimate police investigation of crimes that constitute a breach of the peace. OPINION:Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Womack, Keasler, Holcomb and Cochran, JJ., joined. Price, J., filed a concurring opinion. Meyers and Johnson, JJ., concurred. Keller, PJ., dissented. CONCURRENCE:Price, J. “I agree with the majority that the appellant’s arrest was authorized under Article 14.03(a)(1). I would not address the appellant’s claims under Article 14.05.”

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