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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant argued that the convictions for aggravated sexual assault, indecency with a child by contact, and indecency with a child by exposure violated the constitutional prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense. The court of appeals found that the evidence was legally sufficient to prove that appellant twice penetrated the complainant’s anus with his penis and that he tried to cause the victim to touch his penis. It therefore affirmed the two convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child (by penetration and by contact) and the conviction for attempted indecency by contact. However, the court of appeals held that the other sexual contacts between the appellant and the complainant were incident to the penetrations, and therefore the second indecency by contact offense and the exposure were included within the aggravated sexual assaults. Believing that the Legislature has not indicated an intent to inflict multiple punishments for the same conduct, the court of appeals reversed appellant’s convictions for indecency with a child by contact and indecency with a child by exposure. In its petition for discretionary review to this court, the state challenges only the reversal of the conviction for indecency with a child by exposure. HOLDING:Affirmed. By its plain language, Texas Penal Code 3.03(b) indicates an intention by the Legislature to both permit consecutive sentencing and exempt these enumerated offenses from the consequences of the definition of “criminal episode” found in 3.01; for these offenses only, repeated commission of the same offense or violations of multiple subsections within a single section and tried in a single criminal action may be punished by consecutive sentences. While it is clear from the plain language of the various statutes that the Legislature intended harsh penalties for sexual abuse of children, there is nothing in the language to suggest that it intended to authorize “stop-action” prosecution. Just as a conviction for a completed offense bars prosecution for an attempt to commit the same offense, a conviction for an offense set out in 3.03 bars conviction for conduct that, on the facts of the case, is demonstrably part of the commission of the greater offense. For example, indecency by genital exposure of oneself in the course of manual penetration of another are separate offenses, while penile contact with mouth, genitals, or anus in the course of penile penetration will be subsumed. Thus, indecency by exposure may or may not be a part of sexual assault or indecency by contact, depending on the facts of the case. In this case, there were two essentially identical assaults, separated by a short period of time. On both occasions, appellant exposed his genitals and penetrated the complainant’s anus. The assault in count II was alleged as aggravated sexual assault of a child by causing contact between appellant’s genitals and complainant’s anus. The assault in count I was alleged as aggravated sexual assault of a child by penetration of complainant’s anus by appellant’s genitals, with a separate paragraph alleging indecency with a child by contact by touching the complainant’s anus with appellant’s genitals. The court of appeals affirmed the two convictions for aggravated sexual assault, then correctly found that penetration required contact and reversed that conviction. The state does not challenge that ruling. The record in this case does not show an occasion during the assaults when the exposure was a separate offense. Under the facts of these incidents, exposure was incident to and subsumed by the aggravated sexual assault, the court concludes. While disagreeing with some of its reasoning, the court finds, based on the provisions of 3.03, that the court of appeals did not err in its conclusions, given the facts of this case as established at trial. OPINION:Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Meyers, Price, Womack, Holcomb, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Hervey, J., filed a concurring opinion in which Keller, P.J., and Keasler, J., joined.

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