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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Clyde C. White died on March 28, 2001, in Midland County, Texas. On April 10, an application for probate of his will was filed. On May 16, the appellants, Virginia Mae White and Juanita Ruth Proctor, daughters of Clyde C. White, filed their opposition to probate of the will claiming that their father lacked testamentary capacity to make a valid will and that the appellee, Glenda White, their stepmother, exerted undue influence over Clyde C. White at the time of the execution of the will in question. The appellants, Carlton Procter, Brandye Proctor Norman, Eva Smith, Barbara Lynn, Trina Bridgeman Santiago and Treva Bridgeman Walker, joined in the filing by including an Original Petition asserting various causes of action for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, violations of the Texas Trust Act, conversion of property and theft. On Dec. 5, Glenda White filed a motion for partial summary judgment addressing the claims of testamentary capacity and undue influence. On Jan. 24, 2002, Virginia White and Juanita Proctor filed their response to the motion, arguing that issues of material fact existed. On May 7, the trial court granted Glenda White’s motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the last will and testament of Clyde C. White was a valid will and that it should be admitted to probate. Thereafter, the court set the matter for trial, severing the claims related to the causes of action based on a constructive trust and violations of the Texas Trust Act, transferring them to the district court. The remaining appellants’ causes of action relating to allegations of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty were challenged by Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment filed Oct. 22, 2002. The appellants, Carlton Proctor, Brandye Proctor Norman, Eva Smith, Barbara Lynn, Trina Bridgeman Santiago and Treva Bridgeman Walker, filed their response on Nov. 6. A supplement to the response was filed on Nov. 8. Glenda White filed a reply on Nov. 12. The trial court granted final summary judgment on Nov. 21. This appeal follows. HOLDING:Affirmed. The appellees filed a motion for summary judgment against all the causes of action asserted by the plaintiffs, alleging 1. traditional grounds based on the affirmative defense of statute of limitations to most of the claims; and 2. as a “no evidence” motion for summary judgment under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 166 (a)(I). The trial court granted the motion without specifying the grounds. The court notes that appellants’ response, though lengthy, is repleat with broad references to factual allegations which the appellants’ indicate that they will prove at a future time. The evidence which appellants contend exists to prove these complaints is not included in the record. Further, a review of appellants’ response to the motion for summary judgment consistently references the depositions and exhibits attached to the appellee’s motion for summary judgment in broad, general terms as proof that “there are genuine issues of material fact” without further explanation or argument, the court finds. The court states that the appellant’s response is difficult to understand and their summary judgment proof consists of references to the depositions attached to the appellee’s motion, a few documents which illustrate various transactions that occurred among the parties, and three affidavits. The affidavits consist of two documents prepared by Virginia White, attached as exhibits “A” and “F”to the response and one by D.L. Caldwell attached as exhibit “D.” The court finds that none of the documents attached provide any evidence supportive of the causes of action asserted by the appellants. Whether the documents could become relevant or supportive cannot be determined because of the manner in which the response was drafted. The appellants do not present any argument which explains how any of the documents are proof in support of the allegations and the affidavits on their face prove nothing. Broad conclusory statements are not valid summary judgment evidence. Turning to the affidavits, the court notes that the affidavits provide no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of Clyde White and amount to no more than the speculative musings of two members of this family in conflict. Virginia White’s affidavit attached as Exhibit A to appellants’ response is merely a record of her observation of the removal of a metal box from the home of Ingeborg White upon the death of Ingeborg White, Dec. 3, 1984, by Clyde C. White. Virginia White states that the box was one in which Ingeborg White’s important papers were kept. She has not seen the box since that time. Significantly, she makes no mention of what important documents were contained in the box nor does she testify that she ever had any personal knowledge about the contents stored therein. The appellants tender this affidavit as proof of the existence of a note reflecting a debt of $500,000 allegedly owed by Clyde White to the Estate of Ingeborg White. The affidavit as submitted, the coust finds, is no evidence of the existence of a note nor is it any evidence of the existence of the $500,000 debt. Virginia White provides a second affidavit describing her involvement with the documentation and clarification of a series of financial transactions that occurred between Emma White (Clyde White’s mother), and Clyde White during some type of IRS investigation of Clyde White in 1989. The affidavit explains that Virginia White prepared some written reports tracking transactions based upon the information provided to her by Clyde White. She stated that “[i]t was a very limited parameter I had access to” confirming that her own knowledge about the transactions at issue is incomplete. The affidavit itself is, in essence, a list of several transactions about which Virginia White has some knowledge. The affidavit fails to make any affirmative representations of wrongdoing about which Virginia White has knowledge. The court finds that it is nothing more that mere speculation and does not rise to the level of more than a scintilla of evidence. According to the court, the appellant’s response is essentially a pronouncement that the accumulated documents establish that “there are genuine issues of material fact” and, therefore, the appellee’s motion for summary judgment should be denied. The court’s review of the summary judgment evidence establishes that the evidence provided is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact, and the legal effect is that there is no evidence. OPINION:Barajas, C.J.; Barajas, C.J., McClure and Chew, JJ.

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