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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Roy Jon filed a suit pro se against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act and the constitution. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit as frivolous Jan. 23, 2002. On Feb. 22, Jon signed a motion to reform the judgment, which was filed March 1. The trial court denied that motion March 22. Jon signed a notice of appeal May 23, which was filed May 30. This court dismissed the untimely appeal for want of jurisdiction July 5. Jon then sought a bill of review in the trial court to determine when the clerk forwarded the judgment to the appeals court. The trial court denied the motion, saying Jon should have raised the issue in his original case. The trial court also ruled that the cause of action was frivolous. Jon filed a timely appeal. He claims the post-judgment deadlines in his prior suit should have been extended because he did not receive notice of judgment from the district clerk. He also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing his claims without giving him the opportunity to pay the filing fee or to voluntarily dismiss the suit. HOLDING:Affirmed. The court finds no argument in support of Jon’s second claim, so the court considers that argument abandoned. The court agrees that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4), cited by Jon, allows post-judgment deadlines to be extended under certain circumstances. Specifically, the court agrees that Rule 306a(4) provides an exception to the basic time limits if the party does not receive notice or acquire actual knowledge of the dismissal within 20 days after the signing of the judgment or other appealable order. The court finds, however, that the exception does not apply in Jon’s case. First, the exception merely enlarges the time for filing post-judgment motions, time which Jon did not need because he obviously received timely notice or actual knowledge of the trial court’s judgment dismissing his lawsuit because he did, in fact, file a post-judgment motion within 30 days of the signing of that judgment. Second, the rule provides that “in no event shall such periods begin more than 90 days after the original judgment or other appealable order was signed.” Jon says he did not receive notice of the March 22 order until July, which was more than 90 days. Even if Rule 306a(4) did apply to Jon, he failed to file a sworn motion in the trial court establishing the date on which he first received notice or acquired actual knowledge of the signing of the order, as is required by Rule 306a(5). OPINION:Ross, J.; Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

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