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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:After William Owen Juvrud, the appellee, pleaded guilty to one count of misapplication of fiduciary property, the trial court, pursuant to a plea bargain between Juvrud and the state, deferred adjudication of Juvrud’s guilt and placed him on community supervision for 10 years. Approximately four months later, Juvrud filed a motion to dismiss and discharge his community supervision. The trial court granted Juvrud’s motion, discharged him from community supervision, and dismissed the indictment against him. On appeal, the state argued that “the trial court lacked the authority to discharge Juvrud’s community supervision and dismiss the indictment before he had satisfactorily completed two years of community supervision as required by Article 42.12, section 20.” Juvrud responded that the trial court discharged him pursuant to 5(c) of Art. 42.12, which does not impose any minimum length of time for community supervision. The Eighth Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. By reference to the legislative history of the sections, the court of appeals concluded that 20 applies only to regular (also known as “straight”) community supervision, while 5(c) governs the early termination of deferred-adjudication. Because 5 provides no minimum term which must be served before a defendant is eligible for early termination, the court of appeals held that the trial court had authority to terminate Juvrud’s community supervision. HOLDING:Affirmed. While the title of 20 may be misleading, a close reading of the article demonstrates that 20 and its procedures for terminating community supervision do not apply to a defendant placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision. Rather, 5(c) controls deferred-adjudication community supervision and requires no minimum term of supervision that must be served before early dismissal. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Art. 41.12 5(c), the section at issue in this case, provides the requirements regarding the expiration of deferred-adjudication community supervision. Under this section, “[t]he judge may dismiss the proceedings and discharge a defendant, other than a defendant charged with an offense requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender . . . prior to the expiration of the term of community supervision if in the judge’s opinion the best interest of society and the defendant will be served.” Under this section, a dismissal and discharge “may not be deemed a conviction for the purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law for conviction of an offense,” although the fact that a defendant had received deferred-adjudication may be considered by a judge or jury (in the punishment stage of a subsequent criminal conviction), by a state agency (if the defendant is an applicant for a license or is a licensee under Human Resources Code, Chapter 42), or by the Interagency Council on Sex Offender Treatment (if the defendant is a person who has applied for registration to provide mental health or medical services for the rehabilitation of sex offenders). Finally, 5(d) provides the limitations on a trial court’s granting of deferred adjudication, and 5(e) deals with the confidentiality of deferred-adjudication. When necessary, 5 references other sections of Art. 42.12. In regard to dismissing and discharging a defendant prior to the expiration of the term of community service, there is no reference to 20, or to any other section of Art. 41.12. Section 20 provides the guidelines for the reduction or termination of community supervision. Although its title, “Reduction or Termination of Community Supervision,” refers generally to “community supervision,” the definition of which includes deferred adjudication, its language indicates that 20 can apply only to the types of community supervision that follow a conviction and sentence. Under this section, “[a]t any time, after the defendant has satisfactorily completed one-third of the original community supervision period or two years of community supervision, whichever is less, the period of community supervision may be reduced or terminated by the judge.” After community supervision is successfully completed, “the judge, by order duly entered, shall amend or modify the original sentence imposed, if necessary, to conform to the community supervision period and shall discharge the defendant. If the judge discharges the defendant the judge may set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, information, or indictment against the defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties resulting from the offense.” However, should the defendant again be convicted of another criminal offense, “proof of the prior conviction or plea of guilty shall be made known to the judge.” From its language, 20 concerns defendants placed on community supervision after they were convicted. Among the types of community supervision � regular, shock, boot camp, state jail, deferred adjudication � all but deferred adjudication require a conviction first. Thus, there is no mention of conviction in 5 which deals with deferred-adjudication. However, under 20, a judge can amend or modify the sentence (not present under deferred adjudication), set aside the verdict (not present under deferred adjudication), and must be made aware that the defendant had a prior conviction or guilty plea, should the defendant again be convicted (not present under deferred adjudication because the initial grant of community supervision is not deemed a conviction). Section 20 also grants the judge authority to set aside the verdict: “if the judge discharges the defendant under this section, the judge may set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea, and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against the defendant. . .” Under 5, the judge has no such discretion; the judge must dismiss the proceedings against a defendant when the judge discharges the defendant from deferred-adjudication. More important is the reference to “under this section.” Section 5(c) and 20 each refer to a dismissal and discharge “under this section.” This provides support for the conclusion that these are separate and distinct early-termination procedures and the legislature, in creating these two distinct termination sections, made them such. If the Legislature had intended for 20′s procedures for early termination to apply to 5(c) and deferred-adjudication, it could have done so � either by eliminating the “under this section” restricting language or by referencing one section in the other. OPINION:Womack, J.; en banc.

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