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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In Feb. 1999, John Brennan enrolled in United Technical Institute of Texas, Inc.’s entry-level automotive mechanic school. He suffers from learning disabilities in the form of dyslexia and attention deficit disorder. While at UTI, he requested and received numerous accommodations for his disabilities, including untimed tests, oral tests, color overlays, extra tutoring and other assistance. He graduated from UTI in June 2000. Although UTI’s program focuses on basic entry-level automotive skills, its affiliate corporation, Custom Training Group Inc., provides more advanced training that focuses on automobiles from specific manufacturers. Brennan’s performance at UTI earned him admission into CTG’s Mercedes Benz Elite post-graduate training program (the Elite Program). CTG maintains separate staff and facilities from UTI and is also completely independent from Mercedes. Mercedes, however, provides funding for CTG and works with CTG in establishing admissions and failure standards and developing a curriculum that will enable CTG’s students to gain employment with a Mercedes Benz dealership. Admission into the Elite Program, however, is not an offer of employment. In fact, program graduates never end up employed by Mercedes (a parts distribution entity), but rather seek employment from independent Mercedes Benz dealerships and service centers. Brennan admits that he never received wages, benefits, or compensation of any kind from UTI, CTG (which was not named as a defendant) or Mercedes. On Jan. 29, 2001, Brennan began his training in CTG’s Elite Program under the impression that accommodations similar to those he received at UTI would be made available to him at CTG. Despite his requests for these accommodations, CTG refused to accommodate his disability, allegedly informing him, “We don’t do that here.” After failing an exam, Brennan was removed from the Elite Program on April 9, 2001. Brennan filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and received a right to sue letter. He then sued, alleging violations of the ADA and intentional infliction of emotional distress The district court held that he lacked standing to bring his ADA claim and could not demonstrate evidence sufficient to support his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. HOLDING:Affirmed. This court has yet to address the proper scope of standing under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Other circuits have adopted the reading favored by the district court in this case � i.e., requiring the existence of an employment relationship. In McGuinness v. Univ. of N.M., 170 F.3d 974 (10th Cir. 1998), the court rejected a suit by a medical student who claimed discrimination, because the lack of compensation received by students for their work foreclosed the possibility of finding the requisite employment relationship required to bring a claim under Title I. Under the text of the Americans with Disabilities Act, plaintiffs such as Brennan cannot state a viable claim. Section 12112 specifically discusses employment opportunities. Its only provision under which Brennan can attempt to find shelter is its reference to “job training.” This phrase, however, when read in context, is unhelpful to Brennan. The entirety of 12112 affords protection to “qualified individuals with a disability,” in the context of employment decisions. Under Brennan’s reading of the statute, every educational institution in which a student received tutelage that may one day be useful in the procurement of employment would be compelled by the ADA to provide the accommodations Brennan sought at CTG. The court rejects this reasoning. Therefore, although it is obvious that Brennan and others are enrolled in CTG’s Elite Program with an eye toward receiving training that would help them gain employment from a small group of specific employers, it is equally manifest that no such employment relationship yet existed. Brennan never received compensation for his “work” at the Elite Program (either from Mercedes, UTI, or even CTG), nor did he ever apply for employment with any of the named defendants. The district court was correct in granting summary judgment with respect to Brennan’s ADA claim. The district court appears correct in its conclusion that Brennan has been unable to demonstrate any evidence suggesting the sort of “severe” distress that is required for recovery under a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. But, putting the nature of the alleged distress aside, Brennan cannot demonstrate a scintilla of evidence suggesting the defendants’ conduct constituted anything near the sort of outrageous behavior needed to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. OPINION:Smith, J.; Jones, Smith and Stewart, JJ.

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