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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:April Niskar filed for divorce from her husband, Michael, in July 2002. The couple has a severely disabled daughter: she is blind, mentally retarded, confined to a wheelchair, has to be fed through a tube and requires 24-hour care. An associate judge in Dallas County recommended temporary orders that appointed both parents as joint managing conservators, gave April the right to designate the child’s primary residence and gave Michael access to the child for three hours every Tuesday and Thursday. The orders also required Michael to pay $1,000 per month in temporary child support, and required him to maintain a health insurance policy for the child and to pay 75 percent of the non-covered health expenses. The trial court entered temporary orders based on the associate judge’s recommendations. Meanwhile, April filed another original petition for divorce in a Collin County court, the county where the parties resided. That court granted the parties’ joint motion to transfer to the suit affecting the parent-child relationship in Dallas County to the Collin County court. On motion for temporary orders, the Collin County court ordered Michael to pay $750 per month in temporary spousal support. When Michael did not pay child support under the Dallas County court order, or spousal support under the Collin County court order, the Collin County court found Michael in contempt. The Collin County court also heard arguments on Michael’s motion to modify the temporary child and spousal support orders. The trial court modified the visitation order by increasing visitation time, reducing spousal support to $250 per month, and keeping child support at $1,000 per month. There was a one-day trial and a divorce was granted in April 2003. Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. Michael filed a motion for judgment nunc pro tunc a month later because he said the trial court’s final decree didn’t match up to its judgment. Notably, the divorce decree required Michael to maintain a life insurance policy on the child. The trial court denied the motion, and Michael’s motion for new trial was overruled by inaction. On appeal, Michael argues the terms of the decree regarding possession of and access to the child with respect to his work schedule and illness of the child are not specific enough to be enforced by contempt proceedings. He also argues that the evidence does not support the restriction by the trial court with respect to his possession of and access to the child, denying him overnight possession of the child for at least two years; that the trial court deviated from the statutory guidelines when ordering the amount of child support, even though it explicitly stated that it was ordering support according to the guidelines; that the divorce decree recites that he must maintain a life insurance policy, but the trial record is silent on this subject; and that he was not afforded a hearing on his appeal from the report of the associate judge. HOLDING:Affirmed in part; affirmed as modified in part; reversed and rendered in part. The court first considers whether the divorce decree terms regarding possession of and access to the child with respect to his work schedule and illness of the child are specific enough to be enforced by contempt. The trial court ordered April “to accommodate any changes” to Michael’s work schedule and to “cooperate” with Michael when the child’s illnesses prohibited Michael from exercising his visitation rights. The court finds that the divorce decree does not state in clear and unambiguous terms what April had to do to comply with its terms. Though acknowledging the difficulties of coordinating schedules and visitation with the child’s illnesses, the court finds that the “very serious consequences of contempt or the inability to enforce the judgment by contempt” required clear, unambiguous terms. The court thus reverses and renders a new decree provision that excludes the ambiguous terms about accommodation and cooperation. The court next considers whether the evidence supports the restriction that Michael not have overnight possession of the child for at least two years. Family Code �153.192(b) sets forth a rebuttable presumption for a standard possession order. A trial court may deviate from the standard order upon consideration of such factors as the child’s age, circumstances and needs. A trial court may find that overnight visits may not be in the child’s best interest, and such a finding would not be the same as denying a parent visitation rights. Nonetheless, when circumstances change, a parent can file a motion to modify a trial court’s order. Here, there is ample evidence that because of Michael’s prior lack of involvement in the child’s care, overnight visits are not in the child’s best interest. But, because the trial court can’t know whether the circumstances will change, it was error for the trial court to impose the overnight visitation ban for two years, in essence precluding Michael from filing a motion to modify the order within those two years. The court modifies the decree so that two-year limit is omitted. The court then turns to the child support order to see if the evidence supports the amount ordered, and to see whether it was proper to order Michael to maintain a life insurance policy on the child. Since Michael did not provide a record of how the trial court calculated a child support order of $120 per week, the court assumes without deciding that the order varies from the guidelines. The court then points to evidence that Michael earned an undisclosed amount from managing a topless bar. Deferring to the trial court’s assessment of the parties’ credibility on the issue of the extra income, the court upholds the order. The court rejects the order regarding the life insurance policy, however. Though it is permissible to order child support payments to continue past a child’s 18th birthday, the court rules that in the absence of specific evidence, no statutory equivalent permits an order for a parent to maintain a life insurance policy for the duration of the child’s life. Finally, the court finds nothing in the record reflecting any motion to appeal the associate judge’s report. OPINION:Lang, J.; Whittington, Lang and Lang-Miers, JJ.

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