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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A La Salle County grand jury presented two indictments charging appellant, then a sergeant in the Texas Department of Public Safety, with official oppression under Texas Penal Code �39.03(a)(1). Section 39.03 provides in relevant part: (a) A public servant acting under color of his office or employment commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally subjects another to mistreatment or to arrest, detention, search, seizure, dispossession, assessment, or lien that he knows is unlawful; (2) intentionally denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, knowing his conduct is unlawful; or (3) intentionally subjects another to sexual harassment. The first indictment alleged that appellant, on or about July 2, 1998, “intentionally subject[ed] Jose Luis Napoles to an arrest that [appellant] knew was unlawful.” The second indictment alleged that appellant, on or about that same date, “intentionally subject[ed] Jose Luis Napoles to mistreatment that [appellant] knew was unlawful, to-wit causing Jose Luis Napoles to strike a motor vehicle.” The state presented evidence that appellant, during a routine traffic stop, physically assaulted Napoles and then arrested him without a warrant and without probable cause. The trial court consolidated the two cases for trial, and, later, a jury found appellant guilty under both indictments. The jury assessed appellant’s punishment in each case at incarceration for six months and a $2,000 fine. On direct appeal, appellant argued, apparently for the first time, that he had been twice convicted and punished for the same offense, in violation of his rights under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court of appeals agreed, then determined that the appropriate remedy was to affirm the trial court’s judgment with respect to the first indictment � the “official oppression by unlawful arrest” indictment � and to reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a judgment of acquittal with respect to the second indictment � the “official oppression by unlawful mistreatment” indictment. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the state’s petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s judgment and rendering a judgment of acquittal with respect to the second indictment. HOLDING:The court of appeals erred in holding that the double jeopardy clause barred appellant’s conviction for official oppression. The court finds that Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) controls the disposition of this case. In Vick, the court reversed district court and court of appeals opinions finding that double jeopardy barred a second indictment for “intentionally causing his mouth to contact a female child’s sex organ” of a man who’d been acquitted of “intentionally causing his sex organ to penetrate a female child’s sex organ.” The Vick court found that a second prosecution comported with the double jeopardy clause, because “the two indictments alleged violations of separate and distinct statutory aggravated sexual assault offenses . . . involv[ing] separate and distinct acts.” 991 S.W.2d at 833. The Vick court said determining the constitutionality of multiple prosecutions and thus multiple punishments under Texas Penal Code � 22.021 “require[d] a statutory analysis to determine whether the Legislature intended [to allow] multiple prosecutions [and thus multiple punishments].” Id. at 832. The court found that the Legislature’s decision to criminalize several types of very specific conduct and its use of “or” to separate the offenses indicated that the Legislature intended that each separately described conduct constitute a separate statutory offense. In this case, the court found that �39.03 is also a conduct-oriented statute, criminalizing different types of conduct that cause different types of harm to the victim. The statute also separates its phrases and subsections by “or,” which indicates that any one of the types of conduct would constitute a separate offense. Here, the court finds the appellant was convicted of committing, during a single criminal transaction, official oppression by both “unlawful arrest” and by “unlawful mistreatment.” Each of appellant’s offenses was a separate offense under � 39.03 for which, consistent with the double jeopardy clause, he could be convicted and punished, and the court of appeals erred in holding otherwise. OPINION:Holcomb, J. delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.

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