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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS: The Save Our Springs Alliance, a non-profit, public-interest organization, and the Circle C Neighborhood Association brought suit in district court in Travis County to prevent development in the Barton Springs Zone in Austin, alleging that the City of Austin was granting development permits in violation of a city ordinance. The City of Austin, the Circle C Land Corp., and Stratus Properties filed a plea to the jurisdiction, which the district court granted. The Save Our Springs Alliance and the Circle C Neighborhood Association then brought this appeal, narrowly focusing on the proper application of the doctrines of mootness and ripeness and seeking, in the alternative, an opportunity to amend its petition. HOLDING: Affirmed. The appellants originally filed suit in order to prevent the application of the grandfather clause to Circle C Ranch property because they believed that the legislature had exempted Circle C Ranch development permits from it. See id. � 245.002(a); former �245.004(9). In the course of litigation, however, the city amended the ordinance according to the terms of the development agreement. This amendment was a legislative act by the city and was made effective August 12, 2002. By its terms, it reformed the ordinance with respect to all development permits requested for Circle C Ranch property. Neither Stratus nor the city asserts chapter 245 rights concerning property at Circle C Ranch independent of their rights to rely on the development agreement. In addition, appellants are not complaining on appeal that the development agreement is invalid. Although they included that claim in the amended petitions, they severed and then nonsuited that claim. When filing a claim, a party “may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate counts or defenses.” Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 48. However, because the district court severed appellants’ challenge to the development agreement the same day as it ruled on the plea to the jurisdiction, it did not have two alternate claims before it. Rather, it could consider only the question of the application of former �245.004(9) to the ordinance. As a result, this court also does not have two alternate claims presented on appeal. Thus, the court assumes that the terms of the development agreement apply to this case. In this case, the appellants seek to apply the terms of the ordinance as against the terms of land-use regulations in effect at the time Stratus originally sought development permits for Circle C Ranch. However, Stratus and the city are not seeking to apply pre-ordinance development regulations to requested permits, a situation that would trigger the statutory requirements and exceptions of Chapter 245. Rather, Stratus and the city want to apply the terms of the development agreement, a later-enacted ordinance. Because the development agreement amended the ordinance, Stratus is entitled to rely on that change to the ordinance in requesting development permits. In fact, the city adopted the development agreement expressly in order to allow the kinds of permits Stratus is seeking. Thus, any arguments regarding permits issued for Circle C Ranch property must be measured against the requirements of the development agreement rather than against the ordinance as originally adopted. Because the development agreement is a validly enacted amendment to the ordinance, the court must find moot any claim in which appellants attempt to apply the original terms of the ordinance as modified by former �245.004(9) rather than the terms of the development agreement. The court disagrees that “there is no indication chapter 245 requires a plat application formally be denied before a court can determine the parties’ zoning rights.” Chapter 245 focuses directly on a party’s zoning rights. Because of this focus, when a party presents the question of the proper application of Chapter 245 to a city ordinance, as appellants do here, it must allege some facts to show that the city has applied its regulations to a particular case. A regulatory agency ought to have the opportunity to make a final determination as to which set of land-use regulations apply to a specific plat before a court intervenes. The individual and particular nature of this statutory scheme requires that individual permits be issued or denied for a controversy to be ripe for adjudication. Otherwise, a court would be ruling on a hypothetical application of land-use regulations to plats and interfering with the functions of land-use regulatory agencies before they would have the opportunity to perform those functions themselves. The court considers whether appellants pleaded with the specificity required under Chapter 245. What appellants have alleged is that 1. developers have submitted permit applications; 2. the city’s “1704 Committee” has approved those applications; 3. the “1704 Committee” does not have final authority to issue permits, but that power is reserved to the city’s Zoning and Platting Commission; and 4. Stratus owns property in the Barton Creek Zone and has indicated a desire to develop that property. They did not allege that the city’s Zoning and Platting Commission had issued a permit applying the guidelines of Chapter 245 to property in the area covered by the ordinance. Given a plain reading of the appellants’ second amended pleading, in light of the specificity required for pleading under Chapter 245, the court holds that appellants have failed to allege a claim that is ripe for the district court to review. In addition, because a grant of a permit by the city does not automatically result in immediate development and appellants would have ample opportunity in such case to challenge the granted permit, they will not suffer any additional hardship by waiting until a permit is granted. The development agreement was an amendment to the ordinance, which appellants no longer dispute. Thus, the court will not read the development agreement to be an example of “final approval for development in violation of the ordinance.” After the city filed its plea to the jurisdiction, the appellants amended their petition twice, first a week after the city filed the plea to the jurisdiction and again two months later. The court did not issue its final order until almost two months after they filed their second amended petition and had refrained from ruling on the merits of the ripeness claim to give appellants time for discovery. In addition, the court gave them notice of what it was requiring in order for it to deny the plea, and only after discovery did the court consider the pleadings and arguments and grant the plea. Under these facts, their second amended petition provided sufficient notice to the district court to ascertain the nature and issues of the controversy and the evidence that probably would be relevant. Thus, the court had no obligation to grant appellants further opportunities to amend their pleading. OPINION: Law, C.J.; Law, C.J., Patterson and Puryear, JJ.

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