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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:A jury convicted appellant of capital murder. The trial court sentenced appellant to death. The appellant raises seventeen points of error. HOLDING:Affirmed. The appellant argues, as he did at trial, that portions of the charge could have misled the jury into believing that appellant might be eligible for parole in less than 40 years. The state concedes that the parole charge should not have included the good conduct time language but argues that appellant was not harmed by the parole charge. The court agrees that the parole charge was erroneous since it does not comply with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 37.071 �2(e)(2)(B). The charge did instruct the jury that a life-sentenced appellant would not be eligible for parole for 40 years “without the consideration of good conduct time,” therefore the court doubts that the bolded portions of the charge could have misled the jury into believing that appellant might be eligible for parole in less than 40 years through the award of good conduct time. The issue that is dispositive of appellant’s state law and federal constitutional law claims is whether the jury was so misled or whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the misleading parole charge in a way that prevented it from considering that a life-sentenced appellant would not be eligible for parole for 40 years. The court does not find that the jury was so misled or that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the misleading parole charge in a way that prevented it from considering that a life-sentenced appellant would not be eligible for parole for 40 years. The parole charge informed the jury that a life-sentenced appellant “may” be released from prison after 40 years, not that he necessarily would. The jury was instructed not to consider how good conduct time might be applied to appellant, and there is no evidence in the record to rebut the presumption that the jury followed this instruction. The court cannot conclude that there is a reasonable likelihood that the good conduct time language in the parole charge misled the jury into believing that a life-sentenced appellant would be released from prison in less than 40 years. Appellant, therefore, suffered no harm from the erroneous jury charge. The court overrules the appellant’s other assertions of error. OPINION:Hervey, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which Meyers, Price, Womack, Johnson, Keasler, Holcomb and Cochran, JJ., joins. Keller, PJ., concurs.

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