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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant, Jose Zuniga, was charged in two counts with intoxication manslaughter and manslaughter. The jury acquitted him of intoxication manslaughter but found him guilty of manslaughter. He was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The court of appeals reversed the conviction for factual insufficiency of the evidence and remanded the case for a new trial. HOLDING:The court remands the cause to the court of appeals for a factual-sufficiency analysis consistent with this opinion. The court agrees with the Texas Supreme Court in In Re: C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002), that the burden of proof at trial dictates the standard of appellate review. The court attempts to resolve some of the confusion created by the standard that has developed since Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) by: 1. linking the burden of proof at trial to the standard of review and 2. avoiding language suggestive of a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof. This does not alter the standards elucidated since Clewis, rather, it serves only to synthesize the ideas each decision has provided and to acknowledge the necessity for appellate courts to consider the burden of proof at trial when reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence. There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? However, there are two ways in which the evidence may be insufficient. First, when considered by itself, evidence supporting the verdict may be too weak to support the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, there may be both evidence supporting the verdict and evidence contrary to the verdict. Weighing all the evidence under this balancing scale, the contrary evidence may be strong enough that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met, so the guilty verdict should not stand. This standard acknowledges that evidence of guilt can “preponderate” in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Stated another way, evidence supporting guilt can “outweigh” the contrary proof and still be factually insufficient under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. The court concludes that the court of appeals should not have disregarded the evidence of speeding and passing in a no-passing zone for purposes of the factual sufficiency analysis. OPINION:Meyers, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Price, Johnson, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb, and Cochran, JJ., joined. Keller, P.J., concurred. Womack, J., dissented.

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