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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Christine Pesina allowed her son Eric to ride to school with Becky and Gerald Hudson’s son, Mark. Mark crashed his car into another car on the way to school, injuring Eric. Pesina sued the Hudsons for negligent entrustment. The Hudsons filed for summary judgment, arguing that on the morning of the accident, April 11, 2001, Mark was not an unlicensed, incompetent or reckless driver, and that they had no reason to believe that he was. Both Pesina and the Hudsons agreed that Mark had been involved in six motor vehicle incidents in a less-than-two-year period before the accident. In October 1999, Mark and two others drank whiskey, rum, vodka and tequila before driving to school. Mark admitted to being intoxicated when he drove, and his parents temporarily revoked his driving privileges. In spring 2000, Mark bumped into a tree in a church parking while practicing driving with this mother. His father knew of the incident. In summer 2000, Mark was stopped for driving 75 m.p.h. in a 65 m.p.h. zone. His parents temporarily revoked his driving privileges. In October 2000, Mark rear-ended a vehicle during a failed attempt to pass the car as it turned. The Hudsons knew of the incident. On two occasions in late 2000 or early 2001, the Hudsons learned that Mark had used marijuana before driving. His privileges were revoked until he passed two drug tests. The Hudsons urged the court to look at these incidents separately. They also noted that Mark was not impaired, nor did he have any condition on the morning of the accident. The trial court granted the Hudsons’ summary judgment motion and severed the negligent entrustment claims from the others raised by Pesina. HOLDING:Reversed and remanded. The court establishes that to recover against the Hudsons, Pesina essentially must prove two negligence causes of actions: one requiring proof of Mark’s negligence in operating the vehicle, and one requiring proof that the Hudsons were negligent in entrusting the vehicle to Mark because he was a reckless driver. The negligence in both instances must be the proximate cause of the injury, too, but because the Hudsons did not address proximate cause in the trial court, the court refuses to consider arguments related to proximate cause on appeal. The court rejects the Hudsons’ request that the criminal definition of “reckless” should be applied here, and that under that definition, Mark was not a reckless driver. The court can find no civil cases where a driver’s history was judged under the willful and wanton standard required by criminal law. On the other hand, the court finds several negligent entrustment cases where a driver’s history of driving habits, traffic violations or intemperance exhibits a pattern of deviation from the lawful and proper manner of vehicle operation that if known about would lead “an entruster” to anticipate the vehicle would not be used properly. The court says it will not “engraft the heightened standard for criminalized reckless driving onto the common-law negligent entrustment cause of action.” The court rules that it can consider Mark’s drug and alcohol use, even if there was no specific evidence that Mark was under the influence of alcohol or marijuana at the time of those incidents. The court notes that the Hudsons’ responses to these incidents � suspending Mark’s driving privileges � indicates that they considered them to be driving safety issues. The court agrees that if taken separately, no one of the incidents would have defeated a no-evidence summary judgment motion. But they should not be viewed in isolation, the court finds. “The series of events, compressed as they were to within an approximate two-year period preceding the date of the accident, presented more than a scintilla of evidence that Mark was a reckless driver within the context of a negligent entrustment cause of action.” As for the traditional summary judgment motion, the court notes Mark’s admission to the alcohol and marijuana incidents, plus the speeding and two collision incidents. The Hudsons did not prove that one or more of these incidents were not of a type to be considered on the question of whether Mark was a reckless driver. “Given the record before us those actions and the small amount of time which elapsed between the last corrective action and the accident did not prove that, as a matter of law, Mark had changed, by overcoming his driving history and the risk it presented, and was no longer a reckless driver.” OPINION:Johnson, C.J.; Johnson, C.J., and Reavis and Campbell, JJ.

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