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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The day before ExxonMobil was to hold its annual meeting, 36 people affiliated with Greenpeace went to the company’s corporate headquarters in Irving to protest global warming. There, some entered the building, dressed either in tiger suits or in business clothes, and passed out literature. Some padlocked the entry gates, while others climbed over those gates using an extension ladder. One group carried a rubber life raft around. All of this activity was captured by security cameras. ExxonMobil secured a temporary restraining order against the group for the next day. After a hearing four months later, the trial court granted ExxonMobil a temporary injunction. The injunction prohibited Greenpeace from 1. breaking into or trespassing on ExxonMobil property; 2. tortiously or illegally interfering with the operation of ExxonMobil property; 3. barricading, blocking or preventing access to and exit from ExxonMobil property; and 4. endangering or threatening any employee or visitor to Exxon. The injunction was not limited, however, to the company’s corporate headquarters in Irving. The limitations were extended to all properties of ExxonMobil and its affiliates. Greenpeace appeals the temporary injunction. The group says the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it prohibited actions on ExxonMobil’s property outside of Texas. Greenpeace also argues that the temporary injunction infringes on the group’s First Amendment rights. HOLDING:Affirmed. As to the trial court’s jurisdiction, Greenpeace argues that an injunction that enjoins trespass is an in rem action that is strictly local in nature. ExxonMobil argues that it is in personam and transitory, effective wherever the actor can be found. The court agrees with ExxonMobil. Though local actions must, indeed, be brought in the county where they took place, the court finds that the line between what is local and what is transitory is “shadowy.” The court concludes that “if the crux of the action does not hinge on resolution of issues specific to the land, but upon conduct of the person, the cause should be deemed transitory.” In this case, there is no issue concerning title to land, or the application of local real estate laws in other states. The case is about prohibiting Greenpeace and the individual protestors from performing further tortious or illegal acts. As to the group’s free speech argument, the court determines that the injunction does not restrict speech or expression “in any manner whatsoever.” The injunction simply prohibits Greenpeace from illegally breaking into and trespassing on ExxonMobil property. The court agrees that had this been a free speech case, it could examine the factual sufficiency underlying the order. But as it is not a free speech case, there is not authority to compel such a review. At any rate, the security videotape provides some evidence to support the injunction. OPINION:Richter, J.; Thomas and Justices O’Neill and Richter, JJ.

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