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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:The appellant, North Coast Commercial Roofing Systems Inc., appeals the trial court’s order denying its special appearance. In a single issue, North Coast contends the trial court should have granted the special appearance because it does not have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to support personal jurisdiction. North Coast is an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in Twinsburg, Ohio. The appellee, RMAX Inc., is a Texas corporation with its principal place of business in Dallas. In 2002, North Coast contacted RMAX’s South Carolina satellite plant about purchasing R-Deck material from RMAX. Yvonne Callahan at the South Carolina plant told North Coast that the South Carolina plant did not manufacture, sell or ship R-Deck and that all inquiries and orders regarding R-Deck had to be made to Texas. North Coast nevertheless ordered R-Deck from RMAX through Callahan. RMAX shipped the R-Deck to North Coast from Texas, where it had been manufactured. According to RMAX, North Coast purchased the R-Deck on a credit account that had previously been established. Specifically, in 1986, North Coast had solicited RMAX in Texas to open a credit account for North Coast so North Coast could distribute RMAX’s products. North Coast negotiated with RMAX’s Texas office regarding the credit account. RMAX subsequently sued North Coast in Texas state court alleging it had failed to pay the full contract price for the R-Deck. RMAX asserted specific jurisdiction existed over North Coast because it did business in Texas. North Coast filed a special appearance asserting no personal jurisdiction existed because it did not do business in Texas and the dispute had no connection with Texas. The trial court denied the special appearance. HOLDING:Affirmed. RMAX sued North Coast for breach of a contract in which North Coast agreed to purchase R-Deck from RMAX. RMAX presented evidence the R-Deck was purchased on a credit account that North Coast established with RMAX many years earlier. North Coast specifically solicited the credit account from RMAX’s Texas office. Furthermore, before agreeing to purchase the R-Deck, North Coast was told that R-Deck was made only at the Texas plant and that all orders were made to Texas. Finally, the invoice RMAX used to bill North Coast for the transactions showed that North Coast was required to remit payment to Texas and that any disputes would be governed by Texas law. The court recognizes that contracting with a Texas company and requiring payment in Texas do not alone necessarily establish sufficient minimum contacts to establish specific jurisdiction. Nor does a choice of law provision alone establish jurisdiction. However, the court concludes these facts combined with evidence that North Coast purchased the goods by soliciting and obtaining credit from RMAX’s Texas office are sufficient to show North Coast purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Texas. The court concludes that North Coast had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas to establish specific jurisdiction. North Coast contends any exercise of personal jurisdiction over it would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The court disagrees. To determine whether the assertion of jurisdiction comports with fair play and substantial justice, the court evaluates the defendant’s contacts in light of 1. the burden on the defendant; 2. the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 3. the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 4. the interstate judicial systems interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and 5. the shared interest of the several states in furthering substantive social policies. Only in rare cases will the exercise of jurisdiction not comport with fair play and substantial justice when the defendant has purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state. Thus, when such contacts exist, a defendant must present a compelling case that the existence of other factors would render jurisdiction unreasonable. Here, Texas has an interest in resolving this dispute that involves North Coast’s alleged failure to pay for goods manufactured in Texas by a Texas company. North Coast has not presented any evidence of any undue burden that would be placed upon it by being required to litigate here. Further, RMAX as a Texas company can obtain the most convenient and efficient relief in Texas. Finally, North Coast has not shown litigation in Texas would be inefficient or that any social policies of the several states would be adversely effected. The court concludes North Coast has not presented a compelling case that the existence of other factors would render jurisdiction in Texas unreasonable. The court resolves the sole issue against North Coast. OPINION:O’Neill, J.; Moseley, O’Neill and Richter, JJ.

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