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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:In this employment discrimination case, the appellant, Ron L. Pegram, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, Honeywell Inc., dismissing Pegram’s claims of racial and disability discrimination under 42 U.S.C. �1981 and the Texas Commission for Human Rights Act. Pegram also challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claims to recover employee benefits for violations under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. �1140, as well as the common law theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. HOLDING:The court affirms the district court’s order insofar as the district court grants summary judgment in favor of Honeywell on the timeliness of the state law claims, motion to strike, the disability discrimination under the TCHRA, the ERISA claim and the state law breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. The court reverses the district court’s order insofar as the district court granted summary judgment for Honeywell on Pegram’s adverse employment claims, and remands to the district court. The continuing violations doctrine does not apply to Pegram’s federal claims under �1981. The sole discriminatory acts alleged by Pegram, that the district court found untimely, were the denial on account of race of 1. training opportunities; 2. the approval to participate in Honeywell’s MBA program; and 3. interaction with clients. After Nat.’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002), a one-time employment event, including the failure to hire, pro mote or train, and likewise dismissals and demotions, is a discrete action that “constitutes a separate actionable”unlawful employment practice,’” and therefore, should place an employee on notice that a cause of action has accrued. Under Morgan, discrete acts such as failure to train and refused admission to an MBA program, which are separately actionable, may not be pursued outside the relevant limitations period. Here, Pegram only alleges discrete acts of race discrimination which were all untimely under �1981′s limitation period of two years. The timeliness of Pegram’s claims based on his service account manager reassignment and the termination of his employment do not salvage his untimely claims. Nor does Pegram expressly assert that the cumulative effect of these isolated instances created a hostile work environment claim cognizable under either the TCHRA charge or the EEOC charge. Thus the district court correctly ruled that the continuing violations doctrine does not provide shelter to Pegram’s claims of discrete acts of racial discrimination prior to May 4, 1999. Even assuming the continuing violations doctrine applies to Pegram’s TCHRA claims, such claims are time-barred on these facts, because Pegram’s state law claims set forth the same allegations as his federal claims. Because the district court did not address the merits of Pegram’s termination claim and specifically did not evaluate whether Pegram had presented direct or indirect evidence of termination, the court finds that the district court erred in dismissing Pegram’s �1981 claim without analysis or discussion. Circuit precedent establishes that in cases where the evidence produces no objective showing of a loss in compensation, duties or benefits, but rather solely establishes that a plaintiff was transferred from a prestigious and desirable position to another position, that evidence is insufficient to establish an adverse employment action. Serna v. City of San Antonio, 244 F.3d 479 (5th Cir. 2001). On these facts, Pegram’s claim that his reassignment from a total plant account manager to a service account manager was a less prestigious or desirable transfer, without more, would not lift him over the hurdle of summary judgment for the purpose of an adverse employment action. Several of Pegram’s allegations in this case raise a question of fact as to whether the reasons Honeywell adduced for transferring him were merely pretextual. Under the ADA and TCHRA, an individual who is not in fact disabled may have a viable claim that he was “regarded as” disabled if the employer mistakenly believes that: 1. the individual has a physical impairment that is subst antially limiting; or 2. an actual, but not-limiting impairment is substantially limiting. Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Honeywell on Pegram’s disability discrimination claim. OPINION:Carl E. Stewart, J.

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