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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Lee Hickman Investments, the appellant, appeals from a take nothing summary judgment granted during the pendency of the appellant’s interlocutory appeal of the dissolution of a temporary injunction restraining Alpha Invesco Corporation, appellee, from marketing, selling, or conveying property pursuant to a trustee’s deed and from filing the deed for record. Appellant claims that the interlocutory appeal effected an automatic stay under former �51.014(b) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and the summary judgment should be set aside because it was granted while the automatic stay was still in effect, and the temporary injunction reinstated. HOLDING:The trial court’s judgment dissolving the temporary injunction and voiding the lis pendens notice is reversed and rendered. The trial court’s judgment granting a summary judgment is reversed and remanded. The appellant’s claims that its appeal of the trial court’s interlocutory order had the effect of staying the commencement of trial pending the resolution of the appeal, and the trial court violated the stay by granting the summary judgment, which was the same as commencing trial. The appellant cites Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan, 751 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1988), for the proposition that a summary judgment proceeding is a trial of a case. While Goswami held that a summary judgment proceeding is a trial within the meaning of Rule 63 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the amendment of pleadings within seven days of trial, the court concludes the same reasoning applies in this case to hold a summary judgment proceedings is a trial within the meaning of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code �51.014(b). The cases cited by the appellee are not on point. The appellee further argues that even if summary judgment proceedings are considered the commencement of trial, the appellant waived any trial court error by not attempting to mandamus the trial court from entering the summary judgment. The appellee cites an unpublished opinion to support its argument and cites no other authority. However, mandamus relief is not available where there is an adequate remedy by appeal. While Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.53 gives the trial court authority to proceed with a trial on the merits while an appeal from an interlocutory order is pending, it prohibits the trial court from making an order that interferes with or impairs the jurisdiction of the appellate court or the effectiveness of any relief sought or that may be granted on appeal. The effectiveness of the relief sought by the appellant in the interlocutory appeal, or that may have been granted appellant in that appeal, was interfered with and impaired by the granting of the summary judgment by the trial court. The jurisdiction of the 14th Court of Appeals was interfered with and impaired because it dismissed the interlocutory appeal by concluding that the summary judgment was a final judgment which made the appeal moot,and did not rule on the merits of appellant’s cause of action. Although the trial court dissolved the temporary injunction it originally ordered, appellant had the right to appeal, and was not required to obtain a ruling of the appellate court prior to the trial court ruling on the summary judgment motion. A notice of automatic stay was filed by appellant on Aug. 10, 2000. In its response to the appellee’s motion for summary judgment, the appellant again called to the attention of the trial court the pending interlocutory appeal and objected to the court considering the appellee’s motion for summary judgment because of the automatic stay provided in �51.014(b). Nevertheless, the trial court heard and granted the appellee’s motion for summary judgment on Aug. 30, 2000, therein denying all relief to the appellant. It was an abuse of discretion of the trial court to deny the stay and rule on the appellee’s motion for summary judgment. Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 962 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. App. Waco 1998, no writ). This abuse of discretion was an error of law which probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting its case to the court of appeals. The court reverses the trial court’s order dissolving the temporary injunction and reinstate the temporary injunction. OPINION:Per curiam; Yanez, Castillo and Amidei, JJ.

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