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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Just before trial began, the state elected to abandon count one of the indictment, and appellant pled guilty to count two, indecency with a child, with the jury to assess punishment. At the time of pleading, the trial court determined that appellant was competent to enter the plea and that there was no agreement as to punishment. It admonished appellant as to the charges against him, the range of punishment and the possibility of deportation if he were not a citizen, but did not admonish appellant as to required registration as a sex offender. The appellant asserted on appeal that his plea was involuntary because the failure to admonish as to the registration requirement violated due process. The court of appeals found that registration was a collateral consequence of his plea and, therefore, failure to admonish as to that consequence did not violate appellant’s due process rights. The appellant now presents the same claim, alleging violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Texas Constitution Article I, ��10 and 19. HOLDING:Affirmed. If the consequence is definite and largely or completely automatic, then it is a direct consequence. This standard is close to the standard set out in Ex Parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); a direct consequence is one that is “a definite, practical consequence of a defendant’s plea.” Here, the consequence, registration as a sex offender, is definite. It is also completely automatic; if a defendant pleads to an enumerated offense, he must register; there are no exceptions, no wiggle room, no conditions which relieve him of that obligation. The consequence is also “practical” in the sense that it is logically connected to the plea. Even if the consequence is direct, however, imposition of it without admonishment might still be justified as remedial and civil rather than punitive. The court notes that there are a number of direct consequences of a plea of guilty, such as the loss for a period of years of the right to vote and the right to possess firearms, and ineligibility for certain professional licences, that do not necessarily render an otherwise voluntary plea involuntary by the failure of the trial court to admonish a defendant of each of those direct, non-punitive consequences. These are matters that neither involve the nature of the sentence that could be imposed nor are the direct, punitive consequences about which the trial court must admonish a defendant. They are matters that address the need for the protection of the public good. Failure to admonish as to such matters does not invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea. The presumption of a constitutionally voluntary plea may be rebutted. Generally, failure to admonish properly under Art. 26.13 is subject to a harm analysis. Matchett v. State, 941 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Art. 26.13(c) states explicitly that “substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonitions of the court.” A defendant who pleads guilty after having been properly admonished of his constitutional rights, who has knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights, and who has been admonished as required by the constitutions and Art. 26.13, is presumed to have entered a voluntary and knowing plea. A trial court is not required to admonish a defendant about every possible consequence of his plea, direct or collateral, only about those direct consequences that are punitive in nature or specifically enunciated in the law. The court holds that, although the sex-offender registration requirement is a direct consequence of appellant’s plea, it is a nonpunitive measure, and failure to admonish does not necessarily render a plea involuntary. The appellant has not shown any harm resulting from his asserted lack of knowledge as to the registration requirement. Moreover, the record contains testimony from several witnesses who discussed the registration requirement and its applicability to appellant. The court holds that the failure to admonish appellant as to a direct, nonpunitive consequence of his plea, specifically, the sex-offender-registration requirement, did not violate due process or render his plea involuntary. OPINION:Johnson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which Price, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb and Cochran, JJ., join. Womack, J., concurs in the result. Keller, P.J., filed a concurring opinion in which Womack, Hervey and Cochran, JJ., join. Meyers, J., filed a concurring opinion.

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