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Click here for the full text of this decision FACTS:Lynn Goetz appeals portions of the divorce decree (the “decree”) on the grounds that the trial court erred in: 1. securing the award of property to Joseph Goetz with a lien on property awarded to Lynn; and 2. deciding it had the authority to appoint an arbitrator, thereby modifying the terms of the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. HOLDING:Affirmed. The decree states that it contains a partition of the community property of the parties and that it shall serve as a muniment of title to transfer ownership of all property awarded to any party therein. The decree also treats the MSA as being incident to the divorce by expressly incorporating it into the decree, acknowledging that the award of property to each party in the decree is in accordance with the MSA, and stating that the trial court found the division of property to be a just and right division of the parties’ marital estate. These provisions reflect a clear intent by the parties and the trial court that the MSA was an agreement incident to divorce, rather than a partition agreement. To hold otherwise would render the property division set forth in the divorce decree a nullity because the parties’ marital property would have already been partitioned in the MSA and nothing would have remained for division in the decree. Therefore, despite the “is hereby” language used in the MSA, the court finds no authority or rationale to conclude that such an isolated phrase can overcome the obvious intent of the MSA and decree. Lynn contends that the trial court erred in determining, after the parties were unable to decide on an arbitrator to designate in the MSA, that the trial court had the authority to name one for them if an arbitrable dispute arose and they still could not agree on an arbitrator. The failure to identify an arbitrator, or even specify a method for choosing one, does not render an arbitration agreement unenforceably incomplete. Moreover, to the extent a binding arbitration agreement existed, as Lynn acknowledges and the trial court expressly concluded, the language inserted by the trial court merely reflects the law applicable to the agreement and, thus, did not add a material term to it. Although Lynn urges a different interpretation of the arbitration provision that would defeat its effect as a binding arbitration agreement, she has cited no authority or rationale to overcome the trial court’s determination to the contrary. OPINION:Edelman, J.; Edelman, Frost and Guzman, JJ.

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